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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes areas of consensus and distinctiveness in the security and 
defense policies of the European Union’s three big powers: Britain, France and Germany. 
Owing in part to divergent historical experiences in the twentieth century and before, 
Britain, France and Germany have retained distinct national interests. These interests, in 
combination with each country’s individual security cultures, have determined British, 
French and German priorities for the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP). Germany has advocated the concept of “civilian power Europe,” while Britain 
and France have sought to strengthen the EU’s military capabilities. Furthermore, 
London and Paris continue to have national security objectives that are not reflected in 
the ESDP. While Germany’s security and defense agenda beyond NATO is almost 
entirely supported by the ESDP, Britain and France pursue security and defense policy 
agendas outside the European Union’s framework on a national basis. However, there are 
signs of convergence in the views of London, Paris, and Berlin. Examples include the 
general consensus on threat perceptions, the more compatible policies toward NATO, the 
limited progress in the European Union headquarters debate, the conduct of several 
civilian and military ESDP operations, and last but not least the very existence of the 
December 2003 European Security Strategy.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
According to Simon Hix, Professor of European and Comparative Politics at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science,  
The West European nation-state remains the sovereign actor in foreign 
policy issues so, instead of the EU developing an autonomous identity and 
capacity on the global stage, it is simply a vehicle for the member states to 
pursue those parts of their foreign policy which coincide. When the 
interests of the states diverge the EU becomes incapacitated and the 
member states pursue their interests independently of the EU.1  
Britain, France, and Germany2 are the most influential European Union member 
states in all aspects of policy making, including the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP). This thesis investigates the question: what are the national priorities for 
ESDP of Britain, France and Germany? 
This raises the following sub-questions: are the interests of London, Paris, and 
Berlin fully reflected in the ESDP? Which country has the most influence and leaves the 
biggest footprint in the European Union’s security and defense policy-making? What 
explains its influence? What distinguishes a country’s national foreign policy agenda 
from its ESDP agenda? To what extent do the national priorities of Britain, France, and 
Germany fundamentally differ? To what extent have they converged over time?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Further institutional and political integration in the EU appears to have become 
more difficult at this stage. The cumbersome approval process of the Lisbon Treaty, and 
Britain’s and France’s opposition to departing from intergovernmental structures in the 
                                                 
1 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 2nd ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 398. 
2 The term “Germany” refers to West Germany when the thesis discusses the period from 1949 to 
1990. 
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ESDP suggest that little fundamental institutional innovation in ESDP is at hand. 
Therefore this thesis concentrates on the operational dimension—threats identified, goals, 
strategies, doctrines, and civilian and military operations—to explore signs of deepening 
integration. According to Philip H. Gordon’s judgment in 1997:  
[T]he end of the Cold War, the widening of the Union, the continued 
differences in EU members’ strategic culture, ambitions, values, and 
historical relationships, and the lack—even after forty years of 
integration—of a European identity sufficient to permit delegation of 
sovereignty to centralized institutions mean that EU foreign policy 
cooperation will probably remain limited, fragmented, and 
intergovernmental.3 
What has happened in the subsequent decade? This thesis investigates the 
ambitions of Britain, France and Germany as part of their priorities for ESDP to identify 
commonalities and differences among them. Of special interest are the national goals that 
these countries pursue outside the EU framework since they serve as indicators of areas 
of disparity. Once these areas have been identified, it will be possible to evaluate their 
potential impact on further ESDP integration. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that each EU member state’s agenda for the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) contains only items which have a 
reasonable chance of gaining approval in the European Council. In other words, it 
examines the possibility that EU member states have two foreign policy agendas: one that 
is pursued on a national basis and one that they try to implement on the EU level. During 
its EU presidency, when it has an opportunity to serve as the EU’s agenda setter, a 
member state might push its limits a little further to increase its national influence 
regarding the ESDP.  
 
                                                 
3  Philip H. Gordon, "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy," International Security 22 (Winter 1997/98), 
100; emphasis added. 
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While Germany emphasizes the “soft power” aspects of ESDP, such as police and 
rule of law missions, Britain and France want to strengthen the EU’s military or “hard 
power” capabilities. This difference in approach has been reflected in the countries’ 
mission deployments, civilian and military. These operational approaches serve as 
indicators of national priorities and capabilities.  
Furthermore, Britain and France are the only EU countries that possess a realistic 
military capacity to conduct expeditionary operations unilaterally. Over time, as 
integration has proceeded and the European Union’s security and defense project has 
advanced, the willingness of these two countries to take unilateral action may decline.  
This thesis hypothesizes that Germany plays a pivotal role in the ESDP. Militarily 
weak in relation to its economic and demographic potential, Germany will for historical 
reasons not play a leading role in the ESDP—at least not as a single country. However, 
for structural reasons—with policy positions often near the consensual center of most EU 
member states’ positions,4 considerable military might, and great political and diplomatic 
weight—Germany is a pivotal player in ESDP. 
This thesis investigates the cases of Britain, France and Germany because these 
countries are the most influential EU member states in all aspects of policy-making, 
including the ESDP. Examining the history of each country’s security and defense 
policies, from the end of World War II to the December 1998 St. Malo declaration, may 
help to explain subsequent national policy preferences. There follows an analysis of the 
security and defense policy priorities of each country, differentiating between the national 
and the European Union dimension, in the period since the St. Malo declaration. The 
thesis identifies situations in which a specific country was not able to gain support from 
the EU as a whole for its preferred agenda.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Denmark does not participate in ESDP. 
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Finally, the findings of the three case studies are analyzed with a focus on areas of 
consensus and distinctiveness in security and defense policies. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The most comprehensive work on ESDP is perhaps that by Jolyon Howorth. He 
has defined ESDP as ”a political and strategic project, with a common body of 
instruments [that is, civilian and military elements] which all member states—except 
Denmark—agree to implement collectively, and which has acquired its own distinct 
profile and footprint.”5 The EU formally launched the ESDP in June 1999, but further 
integration in the communitarian sense appears to be unlikely at present since EU 
member states generally prefer to maintain the intergovernmental structure of decision-
making in ESDP. Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza differentiate here between 
political and institutional integration on the one hand and military integration on the 
other. They argue, as do Lutz Holländer and Peter Schmidt, that further institutional 
integration is currently improbable due to British and French preferences for 
intergovernmental structures in ESDP. Holländer and Schmidt suggest that the EU 
members advance military integration—especially the interoperability of their armed 
forces—in order to facilitate the formation of ad hoc coalitions, but without duplicating 
existing NATO efforts.6 They do not discuss the fact that similar integration efforts (for 
instance, with police forces) are necessary to improve the European Union’s civilian 
crisis management capabilities.  
The recent work of Christoph O. Meyer investigates whether a strategic culture is 
emerging in the European Union. On the basis of a thorough analysis of the behavior of 
Britain, France, Germany and Poland he identified some areas of convergence—such as 
threat perception, attitudes regarding the use of force, and acceptance of the EU’s ESDP 
                                                 
5  Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 1. 
6  Lutz Holländer and Peter Schmidt, "Möglichkeiten der ESVP angesichts nationaler Europäischer 
Politik," Strategische Analysen (Juli, 2005), 9–10. Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei 
Zylinder für einen neuen Integrationsmotor? Vorraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-
Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der ESVP (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - Deutsches 
Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2007), 49, 38–39. 
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role. However, he also found that major areas of disparity remain, especially concerning 
issues such as collateral damage, high-risk operations and preemption.7  
Lutz Holländer and Peter Schmidt discuss the leadership challenges facing the 
ESDP. In their view, Germany plays a subordinate role due to domestic constraints. For 
example, the national parliament’s approval is required before the executive can send 
troops abroad, and the German public has regularly expressed an aversion to the use of 
force. Britain has greater military capabilities than does Germany, but still tends to 
balance between America and Europe and lacks the political will to assume leadership of 
a project that might challenge NATO’s primacy in European security. Finally, France 
sees itself as the natural leader of the EU but has to concede that Britain’s military and 
political weight is required for the EU to have an effective ESDP. This circumstance 
leads some other EU member states to see Britain in the leadership role.8  
There is a vast body of historical literature concerning the foreign and security 
policies of Britain, France, and Germany during the period from the end of World War II 
until the December 1998 St. Malo declaration. In the wake of the fall of the Iron 
Curtain—the most significant geopolitical event in this era—the Soviet empire collapsed, 
Germany was reunited, and the international security environment changed considerably. 
The disappearance of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat had a major impact on the 
security considerations of Britain, France, and Germany. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
It is impractical in this thesis to examine the security and defense policies of all 
27 member states of the EU. Instead, the thesis investigates the question by focusing on 
the three most influential members of the EU: Britain, France, and Germany. 
 
                                                 
7 Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and 
Defence in the European Union, ed. BasingstokePalgrave Macmillan, 2006), 138–188. 
8 Holländer and Schmidt, Möglichkeiten der ESVP angesichts nationaler Europäischer Politik, 6–8. 
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In other words, this is a comparative study investigating the priorities for ESDP of 
Britain, France and Germany. James N. Rosenau differentiated in his conception of 
foreign policy between orientations, plans and behavior.9 While acknowledging the 
importance of the first, this thesis concentrates on the latter two categories. The 
investigation focuses on specific parameters of these three countries’ security and defense 
policies such as the main threats identified, security objectives, and strategies and 
concepts of operations for civilian and military forces. The end of the Cold War, the 2001 
terrorist attacks in the United States, and the 2005 terrorist attacks in London had (among 
other events) significant effects on European threat perceptions. This thesis identifies 
what Britain, France and Germany perceived as the main threats in the period after the 
December 1998 St. Malo declaration, followed by the security objectives that policy-
makers in these three countries derived from their threat assessments. Furthermore, it 
presents the corresponding strategies of these countries to attain the desired aims and the 
doctrines dealing with the implications for civilian and military forces. The thesis 
emphasizes the security and defense policy priorities that gained approval by the relevant 
EU decision-making bodies and that are now reflected in the ESDP. Policy outcomes are 
measured by taking the actual implementation of policies and operations into account. 
The comparison of the three cases assesses which country has been the most influential 
and has left the most significant footprint on ESDP. 
The investigation is based on scholarly literature, national security documents, 
mission and capability analyses, official EU documents and statements, and published 
interviews. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I introduces the topic and discusses 
the hypothesis and research plan. Chapters II, III, and IV analyze the national and ESDP 
policies of Britain, France and Germany. Chapter V presents the comparative analysis 
and offers conclusions. 
                                                 
9  James N. Rosenau, "The Study of Foreign Policy" In World Politics—An Introduction, eds. James 
Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 15–35, 16. 
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II. BRITAIN  
A. BRITISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY BEFORE ST. MALO 
Britain is one of the three major powers in the European Union (EU), along with 
France and Germany. The “special relationship” with the United States (U.S.) has been 
one of the most significant characteristics of British security and defense policy in the 
decades since World War II. Strong ties to NATO, the United States, and the 
Commonwealth secured British influence in world politics during and after the decline of 
the world’s greatest colonial empire. Moreover, Britain joined the European Economic 
Community in 1973. In the changed security environment of the post-Cold War era, 
Britain had difficulties in defining its international role, and not only in Europe. 
Furthermore, the European Union’s inability to take decisive action regarding the events 
in the Balkans in the 1990s made London rethink its role in European security affairs.  
Britain’s attitude towards security and defense has differed in several ways from 
the attitude of its continental neighbors. The United Kingdom was undefeated in World 
War II and the Royal Navy has been the country’s guardian for centuries. The British 
history of war and battle is one about triumphant expansion, with wars usually fought for 
territory, raw materials and trade routes instead of to defend the homeland. Without a 
natural connection to continental Europe and a comfortable distance from the Iron 
Curtain, the British developed small, highly trained professional forces and substantial 
experience in expeditionary operations in foreign countries after 1945. Conscription 
ended entirely by 1963, when the British Army had all regular forces for the first time 
since 1939.  
In the aftermath of World War II, Winston Churchill’s “three circles” formula 
determined Britain’s position in world politics: an active British role in Europe, 
privileged ties with the Commonwealth countries, and the special relationship with the 
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United States to maintain influence and status.10 Two further aspects have been 
traditional British interests. First, open international trade routes have for centuries been 
of major importance for an industrialized country such as Britain.11 Second, London has 
for centuries sought to prevent the emergence of a predominant power in Europe that 
could act without taking its interests into account.12 
The British are inherently skeptical about large, centralized, integrated structures 
since such structures may undermine their freedom of action and their national 
sovereignty.13 However, in 1973, Britain joined the European Economic Community 
“because of force majeure”—that is, economic reasons—but it was “ready to leave at the 
first opportune time,”14 wrote Luigi Barzini, a famous Italian-American journalist. 
In December 1998, the joint French-British declaration at St. Malo caught many 
by surprise, because it was a major shift in British foreign and security policy. Although 
Tony Blair’s move “was primarily motivated by a sense that unless European members of 
NATO made a concerted effort to improve their military capacity, the Alliance would 
begin to unravel,”15 it indicated a significant step towards deeper cooperation in the 
European Union and Britain’s willingness to actively participate in what became known 
as the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  
 
                                                 
10  Roger Morgan, "The Foreign Policies of Great Britain, France, and West Germany" In World 
Politics - an Introduction, eds. James Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd (New York: The 
Free Press, 1976), 150–177, 158. 
11  Adrian Hyde-Price, "New Labour und die Britische Aussenpolitik" In Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte: Großbritanien, ed. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Bonn: 2005), 9. 
12  Luigi Barzini, The Europeans, 60. David Chuter, The United Kingdom, 105–120, 106. Adrian 
Hyde-Price, New Labour und die Britische Aussenpolitik, 9. Roger Morgan, The Foreign Policies of Great 
Britain, France, and West Germany, 150–177, 158. 
13  Luigi Barzini, The Europeans, 60. David Chuter, The United Kingdom, 105–120, 105. Daniela 
Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei Zylinder für einen Neuen Integrationsmotor? Vorraussetzungen 
und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der ESVP (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2007), 24. 
14  Luigi Barzini, The Europeans, 61. 
15  Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 103. 
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Since 1998, Britain has been one of the major drivers behind ESDP and views it 
primarily as a vehicle to increase European and transatlantic military capabilities without 
duplicating NATO instruments.16 The pragmatic and short-term oriented British, with 
their suspicion towards French long term visions,17 have also focused more on improving 
the EU’s capabilities than on institutional reforms.18 With a clear emphasis on NATO, 
London has served as a bridge between Washington and European capitals for the past 
five decades.19  
Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent capability, together with its desire for 
prestige and its commitment to provide security for its 13 Overseas Territories and the 
Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus,20 is a British security and defense priority that is not 
reflected in ESDP. Although Britain emphasizes the NATO and EU frameworks for crisis 
management operations, it has also shown that it is willing to employ troops in a 
“coalition of the willing and on a national basis.”21 Britain can be described as a nuclear 
weapon state “that clings to its permanent seat on the UN Security Council; however, it 
has neither the political nor the economic clout that it used to.”22 
 
                                                 
16 Michael Clarke, "French and British Security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World," International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 76, no. 4 (Oct., 2000), 725–739, 733. Adrian Hyde-
Price, New Labour und die Britische Aussenpolitik, 12. Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei 
Zylinder für einen Neuen Integrationsmotor? Vorraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-
Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der ESVP, 22. Claire Taylor, The Defence White Paper: Research 
Paper 04/71, 17. 
17 Ibid., 729. 
18 Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack, Policy-Making in the European Union, 5th 
ed, 449. 
19 Kristin Archick, The United Kingdom: Issues for the United States, 2. Adrian Hyde-Price, New 
Labour und die Britische Aussenpolitik, 10. Willliam Wallace and Tim Oliver, "A Bridge Too Far: The 
United Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship," 152–176, 152.  
20 Claire Taylor, The Defence White Paper: Research Paper 04/71, 19. 
21 Ibid., 18. 
22 David Greenwood, "The United Kingdom" In The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative 
Study, eds. Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994), 278–304. 279. 
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B. SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY PRIORITIES AFTER ST. MALO 
Britain and France are the only EU countries with substantial power projection 
capabilities. From this viewpoint it makes sense that the ESDP initiative was launched by 
London and Paris. Howorth has called attention to one of the British rationales behind the 
December 1998 St. Malo initiative: “Blair’s gamble was primarily motivated by a sense 
that unless European members of NATO made a concerted effort to improve their 
military capacity, the Alliance would begin to unravel.”23 Enhancing the EU’s military 
capabilities continues to be one of the major driving objectives—if not the most 
important one—behind London’s plans to further develop the ESDP. But Britain has 
recognized that military might alone is insufficient to deal with today’s complex security 
environment. In 2008, for the first time, the British government published the National 
Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, “bringing together the objectives and plans of 
all departments, agencies, and forces involved in protecting our national security.”24 This 
document and the European Security Strategy (ESS) are primarily used in the following 
section for an assessment of threats, security objectives, and strategies and concepts of 
operation. 
1. Threats Identified  
According to the 2008 National Security Strategy (NSS), “for the foreseeable 
future, no state or alliance will have both the intent and capability to threaten the United 
Kingdom militarily, either with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or 
with conventional forces.”25 Nevertheless, Britain has identified a variety of 
interconnected threats which could affect the country or undermine wider international 
stability. They include international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and 
failed states, pandemics and trans-national crime. These and other “threats and risks are 
driven by a diverse and interconnected set of underlying factors, including climate 
                                                 
23 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 103. 
24 Prime Minister, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependent World (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, March 2008), 4. 
25 Ibid., 15. 
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change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and 
globalisation.”26 The NSS highlights the fact that Russia and China “are already making 
control of energy supply a foreign policy priority.”27 In other respects, it must be noted 
that the NSS and ESS have identified the same key threats.   
2. Security Objectives 
The British core values outlined in the NSS—“human rights, the rule of law, 
legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for 
all”28—are consistent with those of the EU. According to the NSS, promoting such 
values is “the best way to spread . . . security.”29 The NSS also states that the chief 
objective is the protection of “the United Kingdom and its interests, enabling its people to 
go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just and 
prosperous world.”30 One of London’s interests, as mentioned previously, is the 
responsibility to provide security for the United Kingdom’s 13 overseas territories and 
the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus—an objective not reflected in the security strategy 
of the EU.  
Due to limited resources and capabilities, Britain focuses currently on four 
national security priorities.   
 Pakistan and Afghanistan: key priorities for regional conflict 
prevention as well as domestic counter-terrorism; 
 Those parts of Africa suffering from conflict including Darfur, or 
extremism, including North Africa; 
 The Middle East, including Iraq, because of its key role in global 
security and stability, and its totemic status among violent 
extremists; and  
 Eastern Europe, where we support enlarged European structures.31  
                                                 
26 Prime Minister, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependent World, 3. 
27  Ibid., 19. 
28  Ibid., 6. 
29  Ibid., 6. 
30  Ibid., 5. 
31  Ibid., 40. 
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The same areas find recognition in a similar manner in the December 2003 ESS 
and the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS, with the exception of 
Pakistan.  
Together with Germany, Britain was an important advocate of the EU’s Eastern 
enlargements in 2004 and 2007.32 In 2006, during his visit in Berlin, Geoff Hoon, a 
Member of the British Parliament, underlined the importance of EU enlargement: 
The prospect of potential membership alone stimulates democratic  change 
and political transformation. Enlargement has been about transforming 
countries blighted by totalitarianism, by Soviet occupation or by war; it is 
about democracy and the rule of law; about creating decent living 
standards; and about completing the unfinished business of bringing 
Europe back together again.33 
In sum, enlargement is one way to promote the values of the United Kingdom and 
the EU which fosters security and stability on the EU’s periphery. 
3. Strategies and Concepts of Operation  
Britain has a broad view of security. The NSS suggests that tackling today’s 
problems requires the use of a variety of instruments such as diplomacy, development aid 
and defense.34 The ESS emphasizes the utility of the “full spectrum of instruments,” such 
as political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities, “for crisis 
management and conflict prevention.”35  Britain not only supports the call expressed in 
the ESS for greater civilian capacities such as judges, lawyers and police, to avoid the 
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34 Prime Minister, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependent World, 40. 
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chaos usually following a military intervention, but expresses the intention to further 
develop its own post-conflict stabilization capabilities with an integrated civilian-military 
approach. 36    
Early conflict and threat prevention before a crisis or threat fully develops is the 
favored approach outlined in both documents. The ESS uses vague wording when it 
comes to the use of military force.  In dealing with terrorism, failed states and regional 
conflict military means, among others, “may” be needed, indicates the ESS.37  The 
British approach is somewhat more explicit: “we will support a rules-based approach to 
international affairs, under which issues are resolved wherever possible through 
discussion and due process, with the use of force as a last resort.”38  
With a multipolar worldview, London emphasizes that a multilateral approach 
through international institutions, such as the UN, leads to greater effectiveness and 
legitimacy.  On the other hand, Britain supports the reform of the UN Security Council 
and other international institutions because they need “to become more ambitious, 
effective and representative.”39 The ESS takes a similar stance, although more 
cautiously.40 Furthermore, Britain refuses—together with France—to give up its national 
sovereignty by representing the EU’s position in the UN Security Council. 
While the British recognize that the multilateral approach offers the greatest 
advantages in terms of political legitimacy, they are also willing to use their forces in a 
bilateral coalition (with, for example, the United States) or, if necessary, unilaterally. The 
British maintain strong, balanced and flexible national armed forces with the capability to 
cooperate with U.S. forces, as well as the forces of other allies and security partners.41 
Furthermore, Britain decided in 2006 to maintain its independent nuclear deterrent 
                                                 
36 Prime Minister, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependent World, 9–39. A Secure Europe in Better World: European Security Strategy, 14. 
37 Ibid., 9. 
38 Ibid., 6. 
39 Ibid., 7. 
40 Ibid., 11. 
41 Ibid., 8–9. 
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capability. The British armed forces are considered to be among the best in the European 
Union with the highest annual budget.42 For post-conflict stabilization operations Britain 
prefers to work through the UN, NATO and the EU.  
Table 1.   Selected Civilian and Military ESDP Operations 
 
The British preferences for a multilateral approach through international 
institutions and the early use of all available crisis management instruments, including 
military means, are consistent with the preferences articulated in the ESS. But, diverging 
from the common EU stance, Britain makes clear that it will engage also in bilateral 
coalitions or even act unilaterally when necessary; and it is much more willing to use 
force than several other EU member states, as its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
show. Other British missions worth mentioning include the participation in NATO’s 
Operation Allied Force in 1999 and the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. Probably 
owing in part to its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, Britain has contributed fewer 
troops to military ESDP missions than has France (see Table 1). 
                                                 
42 United Kingdom defense expenditures in 2006: 47 Billion Euro, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/defencefacts/ (accessed 21 March 2009). 
Operation British Contribution French Contribution German Contribution 
EUFOR             Artemis 
2003                   RD Congo 
Military: 88 Military: 1785 Military: 350 
EUFOR Althea 
since 2004 
Military: 10 Military: 130 Military: 135 
EUPOL Afghanistan 2003 Civilians: 15 Civilians: 6 Civilians: 44 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
2008 
Military: 4 Military: 1655 Military: 4 
EUMM Georgia 
2008 
Civilians: 19 Civilians: 36 Civilians: 25 
EUNAFOR Atalanta 
2008 
(see note 1) Military: 200 (estimated) Military: 230 
Sources: Official EU websites. 
Note: 1) The operation EUNAFOR Atalanta is led by a British Commander from the Operational Headquarters in 
Northwood/United Kingdom. The exact number of British military personnel involved in the operation is unknown. 
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4. Contemporary Politics 
Of the three circles identified by Churchill, Britain has traditionally profited the 
most from the transatlantic relationship with the United States. Joining the U.S.-led 
coalition in the Iraq invasion in 2003 with little evidence of WMD demonstrated the 
importance of this relationship, although William Wallace and Tim Oliver argue that 
“Prime Minister Blair’s firm support came more from his personal conviction that 
Saddam Hussein’s regime was a threat to global security.”43  However, this key element 
of British foreign policy since World War II is also highlighted in the ESS: “The 
transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the 
United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an 
effective and balanced partnership with the USA.”44 In times of tension, the British 
objective has been to serve as a bridge between European capitals and Washington. Last 
but not least, London has used its special standing in Washington to explain ESDP to the 
U.S. administration.  
One of London’s priorities for ESDP has been to increase the EU’s military 
capability in general but also to enable the EU to cooperate more effectively with the 
United States. In 1999, Britain proposed the Helsinki Headline Goal, which called for the 
EU to develop the capability to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days.45 The British-
French initiative in 2003—supported by Germany—to create the EU battlegroups and the 
European Defence Agency can be considered a success. Battlegroups are mobile units of 
1,500 troops that can be deployed in the range of 6,000 kilometers around Brussels, 
within ten days after an EU decision. The concept was adopted by the European Council, 
and in 2007, the first two battlegroups reached fully operational capability.46  
                                                 
43  William Wallace and Tim Oliver, “A Bridge Too Far: The United Kingdom and the Transatlantic 
Relationship,” 152–176, 152. 
44 A Secure Europe in Better World: European Security Strategy, 15. 
45  Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 103. 
46  Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei Zylinder für einen Neuen Integrationsmotor? 
Vorraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der 
ESVP, 49, 26–46. 
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On the other hand, Britain, among others, disapproved the suggestion made by 
Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg in 2003 to create a European headquarters 
and a European defense union.47 Both were seen as a duplication of existing NATO 
structures. Undermining NATO was not in the interest of Britain. London has always 
held that ESDP should be complementary to NATO. Nevertheless, since January 2007 
the EU has had the option of activating the EU Operations Centre, which is not a 
permanent headquarters. The EU Operations Centre can be staffed with personnel from 
the EU military staff and other ESDP bodies, and it is able to plan and conduct 
autonomous ESDP operations—especially civilian-military operations. Finally, the 
emergence of the EU Operations Centre can also be interpreted as a sign “of an interest in 
the EU in greater autonomy and less dependence on NATO.”48 
As the United States has shifted its focus further away from Europe, “London is 
also as committed as Paris to the project of ensuring genuine autonomy for ESDP in the 
event of crises demanding the EU’s attention in which the U.S. did not wish to be 
involved.”49 Further objectives of the United Kingdom during its EU presidency in 2005 
were to convince the United States that a strong European Union is actually in the interest 
of Washington, and to give new impulses to security-related issues such as climate 
change and development aid for Africa. 
London agrees on several security issues with Paris. At the British-French 
Summit in 2008 both countries expressed their “continuing common determination to 
play a leading role in defence and security, both in Europe and within the Atlantic 
Alliance.“ Additionally both countries called on the other members of the EU to “take 
decisive steps to strengthen European military and civilian crisis management 
capabilities.”50 
                                                 
47 Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei Zylinder für einen Neuen Integrationsmotor? 
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48 David Yost, NATO and International Organizations, 90. 
49  Jolyon Howorth, Prospects for the UK Presidency of the European Union (Paris: Institut francais 
des relations internationales, 2005), 7, 7; emphasis in the original. 
50 Joint UK-France Summit Declaration (Saint Malo, 27 March 2008). 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page15144 (accessed 23 March 2009), 10. 
 17
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Threats Identified  
As the comparison of the ESS and the British NSS shows, Britain identifies the 
same major threats as the EU.  
2. Security Objectives 
Britain’s interests are not fully reflected in the ESDP, and this is unlikely to 
change in the near future. Although Britain and the EU identified the same threats and the 
same hot spots that require attention, Britain has unique overseas obligations that cannot 
be fully reconciled with the EU’s objectives.  The United Kingdom is committed to 
provide security for its overseas territories, and its commitments to these territories 
helped to justify an advanced military force with global reach. As the heir of a colonial 
empire, Britain has accepted its responsibility to tackle global instability with a 
multilateral approach while relying on national capabilities.51 With an emphasis on 
national capabilities Britain is unlikely to deepen EU integration that would restrict the 
country’s freedom of action. In particular, London will continue to insist on its veto in 
ESDP decision-making bodies, and it will avoid the pooling and sharing of assets if such 
arrangements undermine Britain’s overall national capability.  
3. Strategies and Concepts of Operation   
Despite its great military might Britain has also recognized the need for civilian 
crisis management capabilities supporting the EU’s comprehensive approach to tackle 
today’s security problems. Nevertheless, the British Armed Forces play in a league of 
their own when it comes to cooperation with their European neighbors. The British intend 
to continue close cooperation with the “high-end” equipped U.S. forces in a coalition of 
                                                 
51 Prime Minister, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependent World, 33. 
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the willing or in a NATO context.52 Being able to conduct operations with United States 
forces means that the United Kingdom has at least in theory the possibility to influence 
U.S. decisions. However, Tony Blair found during the Iraq crisis in 2003 that his country 
had little influence over Washington’s strategic decisions.53  Nevertheless, it cannot be 
ruled out that seeking influence regarding U.S. military operations overseas is a 
continuing rationale for British policy-makers to maintain interoperability with U.S. 
forces. 
While London has the capability to engage unilaterally, the question remains, 
does Britain have the will to employ its troops unilaterally? The NSS stressed the “rules-
based approach”54 through international institutions, but left the option open for the 
collective and unilateral use of force in self-defense. ESDP might offer at least an 
alternative to unilateral considerations by providing some collective legitimacy. It must 
nonetheless be recognized that, in the end, when the interests of the great power Britain 
are at stake, the country will do what is necessary to secure its interests. London will 
maintain its freedom of action regarding the employment of its forces.  
Part of Britain’s military might is the nuclear deterrent capability. London decided 
in 2006 to retain a nuclear deterrent. Although Britain could have opted for complete 
reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the British chose to continue with a supplement to 
the U.S. umbrella based on their own means. This capability has been committed to the 
security of Britain’s NATO allies since 1962, in that the British have assigned it to 
NATO since that year. Moreover, the British have made their forces available for 
consideration in the deliberations of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group since it was 
founded in 1966–1967. The nuclear deterrent will remain a British national priority for 
the foreseeable future.  
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4. Contemporary Politics 
In the decade since the December 1998, St. Malo declaration the British 
government has made considerable efforts to strengthen ESDP despite a euroskeptic 
domestic media. Britain has advocated primarily the improvement of the EU’s 
capabilities instead of building institutions.  To that extent British interests are reflected 
in the ESS while the creation of the battlegroups can be considered to be a joint success.  
The Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 is another mechanism which will eventually 
increase the EU’s military capability. Because most EU member states are also members 
of NATO, Britain may be successful with its ambitions to strengthen the alliance and the 
European Union.  
D. CONCLUSION 
British interests are to some extent reflected in ESDP. For a broad community 
such as the EU, it is impossible to consider all the exceptional interests of each member 
state. Instead the EU focuses first and foremost on its own continent. As a consequence 
the United Kingdom has to maintain independent forces to provide security for its 
overseas territories—relics of the country’s colonial past. Since Britain does not share 
these interests with the EU, the United Kingdom has to rely on its own capabilities. The 
military might with global reach, the special relationship with the United States, the 
privileged ties with the Commonwealth countries, the nuclear deterrent, and the 
permanent UN Security Council seat are sources of Britain’s self-perception as a great 
power. To preserve this status and to defend its security interests the United Kingdom 
may in the future use force unilaterally. This possibility seems at variance with the 
“effective multilateralism” ESDP approach outlined in the ESS; but the ESS endorses the 
UN Charter, which allows for “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” 
in Article 51.55 Additionally, Britain’s nuclear deterrent and its permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council will remain exclusively national priorities. 
                                                 
55 Charter of the United Nations, (New York: United Nations) Article 51. 
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Nevertheless, Britain has made a difference in ESDP. Despite the distrust among 
Central and Eastern European states regarding French-German ESDP leadership,56 
Britain’s expertise and capabilities are essential for the EU’s security and defense policy. 
A decade after St. Malo it is clear that—thanks in part to British influence—the EU is on 
its way to become a more capable actor.  While this can be considered a major British 
priority, another is the desire for political influence in ESDP. Participating in ESDP is the 
logical consequence of the United Kingdom’s longstanding foreign policy to prevent the 
emergence of a predominant power in Europe that does not take its interests into account. 
The intergovernmental character of ESDP decision-making bodies favors Britain’s 
preferences. Any development that is not in Britain’s interest can be vetoed. In that sense, 
playing an active role in ESDP has been a positive sum game, and not only for the United 
Kingdom. 
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III. FRANCE  
A. FRENCH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY BEFORE ST. MALO 
After the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, and the end of the Algerian 
War in 1962, Charles de Gaulle launched a defense and security policy based on 
“diplomatic and military independence through national nuclear deterrence means, a 
special status in NATO, and an exceptionally high level of national self-reliance in the 
development and acquisition of weapons and other types of military equipment.”57 With 
a pride rooted in its history, France has claimed great power status for several reasons, 
including its permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its nuclear deterrent. France, 
with a colonial history similar to that of Britain, feels especially responsible for its former 
colonies in Africa—including Algeria—and the Middle East; and this is reflected in 
economic ties and security commitments.58 With a certain suspicion towards the United 
States throughout the Cold War and beyond, France has sought to balance American 
economic, military and political power in a multipolar world order with a strong 
European pole.59 In order to minimize Anglo-Saxon influence in Europe, France twice 
vetoed London’s membership application before Britain finally joined the European 
Economic Community in 1973. The European integration project, once initiated largely 
to promote reconciliation between France and Germany, is seen as the best way for 
France to exert its power and serves now to tie the reunited Germany to its closest 
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partners in Europe.60 In 1994, David S. Yost pointed out that “enhanced West European 
political cohesion and defense cooperation . . . [are] the solution to France’s frustrations 
about its limited resources in relation to its ambitions and the way for France to gain 
greater influence in international politics.”61  
With regard to military capabilities France relied heavily on nuclear weapons 
according to General de Gaulle’s doctrine that “nuclear weapons mean the absence of 
battle,” and the country spent up to 40 percent of the defense budget on the force de 
frappe. As a consequence, when the French forces were deployed in the 1990–1991 Gulf 
War, they “were shocked to discover that very few were actually deployable: just 15,000 
out of a total armed force of 289,000.” Furthermore, fighting side by side with American 
troops also exposed technological shortcomings in the French armed forces. The 
experience of the 1991 Gulf War, the 1992 Petersberg meeting of the Western European 
Union (WEU) and the outbreak of the Balkan Wars were factors contributing to the 
abolishment of conscription in 1996 in order to transform the French military “into a 
deployable force for overseas crisis management.”62  
In the mid-1990s, Paris introduced the broad concept of “security” as the 
foundation for stability. It assumed that the new emerging conflicts in the world would be 
rooted in the imbalance between poor and rich regions, and that the resulting threats 
would affect all the countries of the European Union. Accordingly, in 1997 Jolyon 
Howorth observed a pattern of “Europeanization” in several defense aspects and soon 
anticipated that “France’s entire approach to questions of defence and security will be 
properly integrated with that of her European neighbours.”63 A March 1997 French-
German proposal to merge the EU and the WEU, “effectively bringing the mutual 
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assistance commitment under the aegis of the EU,” was vetoed by the incoming British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair.64 This is just one example of many illustrating how France 
has sought to develop an EU security structure independent of NATO in which Paris 
would assume a leading role instead of Washington and London.65 In addition to 
frequently antagonizing Washington, France has not been afraid of diplomatic isolation 
when the national interests of the country have been at stake.66 
During the Balkan wars, about three decades after France withdrew from NATO’s 
integrated military structure, Paris became aware of the EU’s lack of military strength to 
deal with major crises; and it became more often involved in NATO operations.67 
Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza argue that France finally accepted NATO’s 
primacy in European security at St. Malo in December 1998.68 After the emergence of 
the EU’s ESDP, “France moved rapidly from a defence policy of rigorous national 
autonomy towards one geared towards integrated European operations.”69 
B. SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY PRIORITIES AFTER ST. MALO 
During the 1990s, there was some convergence in the views of Paris and London 
with respect to security. France followed the example of Britain to transform its military 
into all-professional, deployable armed forces and both countries realized that the EU 
needed for crisis management capabilities to tackle situations that the United States did 
not want to become involved in. While France had been already at the forefront in 
promoting a European defense arm, it was primarily the shift in London’s attitude that 
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permitted the 1998 St. Malo declaration which was followed by the emergence of ESDP. 
Using ESDP as an additional vehicle in the broader context of the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) to counterbalance the United States with the purpose of 
creating a more stable multipolar world order must be considered one rationale among 
others behind French thinking in the years before and after the turn of the millennium.70 
Fourteen years after the preceding 1994 Livre Blanc, France in 2008 took a new 
approach in drafting The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, owing 
in part to the challenges arising from globalization. Because “the traditional distinction 
between domestic security and foreign security has blurred,” the 2008 Livre Blanc has a 
broader understanding of security than its 1994 predecessor, which addressed exclusively 
the defense realm. The White Paper Commission included representatives of the Civil 
Service, the armed forces, the Parliament, defense and other industries and the academic 
community; and it forged a national security strategy taking not only defense policy into 
account, but also foreign, domestic, and economic policy.71 Quite similar in their 
approaches to security, the 2008 Livre Blanc and the 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS) are the primary sources for the following analysis of France’s identified threats, 
security objectives, and strategies and concepts of operations. 
1. Threats Identified  
Globalization is “shaping international security” and as a consequence the world 
has become more unstable and more unpredictable, argues the 2008 Livre Blanc.72 
Certainly, the chance of an all-out war as prior to 1989 has vanished but the situation of 
France and Europe “has grown more vulnerable than it was at the end of the Cold 
War.”73 The Livre Blanc identifies an extensive list of threats to France and Europe. The 
threats listed are similar to those described in the 2003 ESS, such as terrorism, the 
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proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. According to 
an evaluation, terrorist attacks, cyber attacks, organized crime, and natural disasters in the 
French overseas territories are the most probable risks and threats to France, whereas 
terrorist attacks, ballistic missile attacks, pandemics, and natural as well as industrial 
disasters could be potentially of severe scale.74 While addressing further threats such as 
global warming, energy shortage and espionage, the Livre Blanc emphasizes in particular 
the risks of major cyber attacks with a high potential “for the destabilisation of everyday 
life, paralysis of critical networks for the life of the nation, or denial of access to certain 
military capabilities.”75 Although the Livre Blanc provides a comprehensive threat 
assessment, it acknowledges the possibility that unforeseen threats could cause strategic 
upheavals. According to the paper, “we [the French people] must be prepared for 
strategic upsets resulting from the scale of violence of attempts to thwart the normal 
functioning of our societies, in places not normally expected by our military and security 
means.”76 
The fact that 1.5 million French people live abroad poses a special challenge that 
needs to be addressed by the national security strategy. These people might be exposed to 
natural disasters, terrorist attacks, hostage-taking or regional conflicts. For the French 
living on the national territory in Europe, there is in the foreseeable future no likelihood 
of a conventional military attack.77   
Regarding the geographical scope of France’s new strategy, the Livre Blanc 
prioritizes a strategic arc of crisis from the Atlantic, via the Mediterranean, to the Persian 
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Moscow’s return to Realpolitik. Russia has taken “an offensive line in dealing with 
certain European countries, notably those in its immediate vicinity,” in an attempt to 
restore its status as a major power.79 
2. Security Objectives 
Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of the French Republic since 2007, set out two 
goals in the 2008 Livre Blanc. One goal reflects the first and foremost responsibility of 
any state—that is, to guarantee the sovereignty of the state and to protect its citizens. The 
second objective is to “ensure that France remains a major military and diplomatic 
power,” a longstanding ambition deeply rooted in French culture. The President 
advocated far-reaching reforms in the security sector that address the challenges of the 
twenty-first century in order “to guarantee France’s freedom of action and its independent 
capacity to decide for itself.”80 In addition to the already mentioned objectives of 
territorial defense and the protection of citizens, the Livre Blanc notes two further overall 
objectives of the national security strategy. Those goals are: 
 To enable France to  contribute to European and international security: 
this corresponds both to its own security needs, which also extend 
beyond its frontiers, and to the responsibility shouldered by France 
within the framework of the United Nations and the alliances and 
treaties which it has signed. 
 To defend the values of the “republican compact” that binds all French 
people to the State, namely the principles of democracy, and in 
particular individual and collective freedoms, respect for human 
dignity, solidarity and justice.81 
Similar objectives can be identified in the strategic documents of the EU. Defending the 
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for the formulation of the EU’s strategic objectives. The ESS acknowledges also the need 
to strengthen the United Nations as a European priority and emphasizes the necessity for 
international cooperation.82 
In the face of limited resources and in light of France’s strategic interests the 
country has continuously reduced the number of its pre-positioned forces on the African 
continent since the 1960s. Currently, France operates seven bases in Africa involving 
about 10,000 personnel.83 While Paris wants to gradually restructure the country’s 
presence in Africa—only two bases will eventually remain—it seeks to strengthen its 
position in the Persian Gulf. According to the 2008 Livre Blanc, “This new policy will 
result in deployment of the most modern capabilities in the region, as in the case of Abu 
Dhabi, and a stronger French presence aimed at crisis prevention.”84 The reduction of its 
bases in Africa goes hand in hand with a renegotiation of long-standing legal 
arrangements with certain African countries—a relict of France’s colonial era. For 
example, “clauses relating to possible French intervention to maintain internal order in 
certain countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon or Togo, will be abrogated.” New 
agreements must be based on defense and security partnership rather than on military 
assistance. France invites the EU to become involved when it wishes to do so.85  
Although Africa remains a French priority, the focus of French national security 
strategy has clearly shifted eastward to regions where the strategic interests of France and 
Europe coincide with potential or already existing major crisis centers. While Northern 
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cultural reasons, the Livre Blanc calls for more attention to the Balkans, a balanced 
relationship with Russia and the prevention of a major conflict in Asia that could possibly 
involve Pakistan, India and China.86  
Resulting from its colonial legacy, France has special security responsibilities in 
the French overseas departments and territories which are reflected in the presence of 
about 17,700 military personnel—not counting the troops in Africa. Of exceptional 
importance is the security of the Kourou space centre in French Guyana, which is 
considered to be vital to France and Europe.87 
Although Paris supported the enlargement of the EU to ten additional countries in 
2004, it views enlargement rather critically. It has not only shifted the center of political 
gravity away from France; it also has threatened to slow down the EU’s political 
processes and to undermine the EU’s ability to act efficiently. France does not oppose the 
future integration of the Balkan states but it argues that further EU enlargement must 
consider the EU’s ability to absorb new member states.88 Due to its special 
responsibilities concerning the southern neighbors of the EU, Paris favors a balanced 
approach—especially with regard to financial assistance—between the EU’s policies 
addressing the Union’s eastern neighbors and its policies concerning its southern 
neighbors. Finally, France opposes the integration of Turkey into the EU and suggests 
instead, as does Germany, a privileged relationship with the EU.   
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3. Strategies and Concepts of Operation  
The Livre Blanc takes a comprehensive approach to security which acknowledges 
that the lines between external and internal security have become blurred. According to 
the Livre Blanc, “National Security should be founded upon a strategy of prevention, 
itself based on diplomatic, economic, financial, military, legal and cultural means.”89 
This strategy is consistent with the one outlined in the 2003 ESS and the 2008 Report on 
the Implementation of the ESS: “preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict 
early on must be at the heart of our approach.”90  
But prevention is only one of five broad functions that are considered to be crucial 
to national security: knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection, and intervention. 
Knowledge and anticipation include, inter alia, intelligence and diplomacy and have been 
clearly emphasized as key priorities. “[K]nowledge represents our first line of defence. 
Knowledge guarantees our autonomy in decision-making and enables France to preserve 
its capacity for strategic initiative,” states the Livre Blanc.91  
To address today’s security threats, France prefers to work through multilateral 
institutions for legitimacy and efficacy reasons. Moreover, as Thierry Tardy of the 
Geneva Centre for Security Policy put it, “multilateralism is for France simultaneously a 
framework of action, a way to promote French interests, and a tool to constrain others.” 
Lately, the EU has been the institution favored by France for crisis management 
operations due to historic distrust towards NATO and frustration with UN operations in 
Bosnia and Somalia in the 1990s.92 This preference is not necessarily reflected in the 
numbers of French personnel involved in various crisis management operations (see 
Table 2), but France is committed to increasing the EU’s profile as an international actor 
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by using it as a primary vehicle for crisis management. However, recent developments in 
French thinking regarding NATO-EU relations must be considered and are addressed 
later in this chapter.  
Table 2.   French Personnel Involved in International Operations under Various  
Auspices in August 2009 
 
France is also a strong proponent of reforming the UN Security Council to 
transform it into a more effective and more representative body reflecting developments 
in the international system since the end of World War II.93 This view is shared by the 
other EU member states as it is expressed in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of 
the ESS.94  
Although France favors working through multilateral institutions such as the EU, 
NATO, the UN and the OSCE, it does not rule out unilateral action under national or 
multilateral auspices (e.g., the 2004 intervention in Côte d’Ivoire under a UNSC 
mandate). Three eventualities are outlined in the Livre Blanc that could justify a French 
unilateral action: (a) “the protection of our citizens abroad;” (b) “the application of 
bilateral defence arrangements with certain States;” and (c) “a possible national response 
to one-off actions against our interests.”95 
With a policy similar to that of Britain, France considers the use of force to be the 
last resort once all other measures have been actively exploited.  While legitimacy under 
international law is a prerequisite for the use of force, it appears that the approval of the 
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EU 
 (with UN mandate) 
UN NATO 
 (with UN mandate) 
French National Forces 
supporting UN Forces 
About 2,000 1,879 4,570 1,900 
 
Source: http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article3645#France-s-Participation-in-PKOs (accessed 6 September 2009). 
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French Parliament is also desired.96 A 2008 constitutional change requires the approval 
of the Parliament before the French President can deploy troops for more than four 
months.97 While this regulation limits the power of the President, it also increases the 
legitimacy of the military action, as exemplified by Germany since 1994.  
Together with Britain, France is more prepared than Germany to use force.98 In 
the view of Tardy, “France has a preference for persuasive rather than coercive 
instruments in meeting security threats, but does not rule out the use of force in principle 
or practice; the use of force is part of France’s political-military culture.”99 
NATO and the EU remain the bedrock of security for Europe and France. 
Nevertheless, Paris emphasizes the country’s freedom of action, including the capacity 
for independent strategic decision-making. A process that began with the end of 
conscription in 1996 has received a new impulse with the publication of the 2008 Livre 
Blanc. As part of a comprehensive transformation program France seeks to improve the 
capabilities of its armed forces, while maintaining balanced forces—including a nuclear 
deterrent. The reform of the French armed forces, which requires the elimination of up to 
46,000 civilian and military positions within the next seven years, is intended to result in 
smaller but better equipped armed forces that can be quickly deployed in various theatres. 
France and Britain are the only countries in the EU with substantial power projection 
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capabilities, the Livre Blanc addresses also the funding of the reforms. Beginning in 
2012, the military budget will rise every year by one percent above inflation to ensure the 
financing of the planned projects.100  
France maintains its independent nuclear deterrent. It contributes (together with 
its permanent seat in the UN Security Council) to the French self-perception as a great 
power despite the lack of political and economic clout in comparison with the United 
States. While nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate guarantee for national security and 
French independence, a role in the European context in the future cannot be ruled out. 
The Livre Blanc provides the following hints: “Together with the other European nuclear 
power, the United Kingdom, France notes that there is no situation in which the vital 
interests of one may be threatened without the interests of the other being threatened 
also.” Additionally, Paris offers interested European partners a dialogue about the role of 
deterrence in European security.101   
France has participated in several civilian ESDP missions, and has currently 
assigned 147 civilian personnel to the EU’s largest “rule of law” mission—EULEX 
Kosovo. The geographical focal point of the EU’s military operations appears to be 
Africa, coinciding partially with long-standing French priorities (e.g., the French 
presence in Chad since 1986).102 Out of the six military ESDP operations four have been 
deployed to Africa and two to the Balkans. As one of the major initiators of military EU 
operations (e.g., Artemis RD Congo in 2003, EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, and EUFOR 
Chad RCA in 2008),103 the country has made significant contributions to all military 
ESDP operations (e.g., 1,655 personnel for EUFOR Chad/RCA). 
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4. Contemporary Politics 
As one of the major contributors to ESDP operations France has recognized the 
numerous shortcomings of the EU as a crisis manager and has made several proposals to 
overcome those weaknesses. Already in 2003, at the bilateral summit in Le Touquet, 
France and Britain laid the foundation for the EU battlegroups and the European Defence 
Agency (EDA)—both key milestones in the evolution of ESDP. With the creation of the 
EDA Paris intended to foster the coordination of major procurement projects among EU 
member states and to strengthen the European defense industry vis-à-vis that of the 
United States. Increasing the EU’s capabilities in order to limit Washington’s influence in 
NATO and Europe was one of the major French rationales in 2003.104  
Improving the planning capabilities for ESDP operations has long been a French 
priority, whereas such moves were seen by London as duplicating NATO capabilities. 
Together with Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg, France proposed in April 2003 the 
establishment of a military headquarters in the vicinity of Brussels. But the proposal was 
destined to failure without the support of the EU’s leading military power—Britain.105 
However, it can be assumed that the initiative created some momentum to further the 
ESDP project. In December 2003, the European Council adopted the first European 
Security Strategy. Although the headquarters issue cannot be considered to be resolved, 
an intermediate step is the Brussels-based EU Operations Centre—a non-permanent body 
able to plan and conduct autonomous ESDP operations since January 2007.  
At least since General de Gaulle, France and the United States have had 
frequently diverging views, with the most recent major one being the bitter dispute about 
the 2003 Iraq crisis. With a multipolar worldview France has sought to reduce American 
power, which it has considered to be excessive and unbalanced, Georges-Henri Soutou 
wrote in 2004. He described further the French perception: the United States “has become 
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unilateralist if not outright imperialistic, and it is no longer interested in, and has even 
turned against, the UN, NATO, and a unified Europe.”106 
However, France’s approach to NATO has become more realistic lately in the 
face of today’s overwhelming security challenges. Consequently, the 2008 Livre Blanc 
rejects any competition between NATO and the EU, and emphasizes that the two 
institutions are complementary—in fact, both are needed to “come to grips with the 
threats and crises.” In the hope for a “new balance between Americans and Europeans 
within NATO,” France returned to NATO’s integrated command structure in April 2009, 
holding on to the following three principles set out by General de Gaulle decades earlier: 
1. Complete independence of our nuclear forces; 
2. French authorities must retain full freedom of assessment, which 
implies the absence of automatic military commitment and the 
maintenance of assets allowing for strategic autonomy in particular 
by increasing our intelligence capabilities; and lastly, 
3. Permanent freedom of decision, which means that no French forces 
will be permanently placed under NATO command in 
peacetime.107 
While the Livre Blanc outlines the intended renewed relationship between France 
and NATO, it also highlights long-standing French objectives with regard to ESDP. One 
of the priorities addressed in the Livre Blanc is France’s ambition to elevate further the 
EU’s role in international crisis management. In order to enhance the EU’s military and 
civilian capabilities, the paper outlines several specific goals: 
 Setting up an effective intervention force of 60,000 soldiers, 
deployable for one year in a distant theatre with the necessary air 
and naval forces;  
 Achieving the capability to deploy for a significant duration two or 
three peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operations and several 
civilian operations of lesser scope in separate theatres;  
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 Increasing the European planning and operational capability both 
military and civilian, in parallel to the development of 
interventions outside the European Union;  
 Creating an impetus for and restructuring of the European defence 
industry.108 
Unexpected events such as the Lisbon treaty deadlock, the economic and financial 
crisis and the Russian-Georgian conflict distracted France from pursuing its European 
ambitions during its EU presidency in the second half of 2008. In the view of Daniel 
Keohane, a research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, two objectives have 
dominated the French ESDP agenda: improving the EU’s planning capacities and 
enhancing the military capabilities of EU members. With regard to the latter, Keohane 
has written, “the French argue that EU governments have little choice: they must reform 
their armies and share more of the costs of developing, buying and using equipment,” due 
to expensive operations and rising equipment prices. As discussed earlier, the French 
hope that their military reform will serve as an example and convince France’s EU 
partners to follow its course.109 Among the achievements of the 2008 French presidency 
are the following: 
 A declaration of intent on optimizing the use of airlift aircraft . . . ; 
 A statement of intent on cooperation on space intelligence 
[involving six EU member states] . . . ; 
 A statement on better-developed exchanges of young officers, 
modeled on the Erasmus system in higher education.110  
Further accomplishments include an initiative increasing interoperability among 
European air forces and navies, an agreement to strengthen the capacities of the European 
Defense Agency, and a long-term initiative enhancing the EU’s capacity to deploy 
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helicopters.111 As the latter initiative is a result of British-French cooperation, many 
proposals were made in cooperation with other EU partners. 
During its EU presidency in 2008, France promoted the drafting of an updated 
ESS which was opposed by some other EU members—inter alia, Germany. However, 
with the authorization of the European Council, the Report on the Implementation of the 
ESS was published in December 2008 discussing common interests, new threats and 
means in response to those threats.112 Moreover, France advocates the drafting of a 
European White Paper on defense and security which could include the following: “a 
common European analysis of threats and of the international system . . . ; the definition 
of the European Union’s common security interests; and, a doctrinal framework for 
external intervention and the use of force.”113 
C. ANALYSIS 
The French proposal for the drafting of a European White Paper is not likely to be 
adopted by the European Council any time soon, as the rejection of the composition of a 
new ESS in 2008 has shown. Other EU member states probably have reservations about 
such a project due to diverging national priorities. As one of the most influential EU 
member states, France finds most of its priorities reflected in the 2003 ESS, although 
some national priorities remain neglected (e.g., nuclear deterrence and France’s overseas 
territories). Of particular interest are also major developments in French security policy 
with the publication of the 2008 Livre Blanc. Claudia Major has identified three 
innovative elements in the Livre Blanc:  
The first is a shift of focus away from France’s historic spheres of 
influence towards a “strategic arc” of instability that stretches from the 
Atlantic via the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa and  
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on to south Asia. Second, greater emphasis is put on intelligence. Third, 
the White Paper approves France’s reintegration into NATO’s integrated 
military command structure.114 
1. Threats Identified  
It must be noted that the threat assessment outlined in the 2008 Livre Blanc is 
consistent with the one depicted in the 2003 ESS, and the December 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the ESS. As the June 2008 Livre Blanc has highlighted cyber attacks 
ranging from small to large scale as a threat with a high probability of materialization, it 
appears that Paris advocated the incorporation of this threat into the December 2008 
Report on the Implementation of the ESS. An agreement among the EU member states, 
accepting cyber attacks as a new threat to the EU as a whole, has been fairly easy to reach 
due to the following factors. First, cyber attacks could potentially affect every EU 
member state. Second, the stigmatization of a specific “enemy” is neither necessary nor 
possible. Third, no EU member state finds its national interests challenged by listing this 
new threat in the EU’s strategic document.  
On the other hand, the language used in the December 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the ESS addressing Russia is much more moderate than the tone taken 
in the Livre Blanc. While Paris does not mince words and speaks out directly (see above), 
the European Union document is much more cautious, evidently out of concern not to 
upset Moscow; and it is apparent that it reflects the position of EU member states that do 
not want to confront Russia openly. Germany is certainly one of those countries. 
2. Security Objectives 
Despite many similarities, a few interests of France are not reflected in the 2003 
ESS and the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS. Particularly 
striking in the 2008 Livre Blanc is the emphasis on “France’s freedom of action and its 
independent capacity to decide for itself,” as this appears to contradict EU integration 
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efforts in the defense realm.115 On the other hand, this position is the logical consequence 
of France’s overseas commitments. Paris has to rely on its own armed forces because the 
security of the country’s overseas territories in South America, the Pacific and elsewhere 
is not addressed in the ESS.  
Although France has reduced its military presence in Africa and is about to 
transform certain security arrangements with African states, it shares the EU’s support for 
building up African crisis management capacities.116 France’s planned reduction of bases 
in Africa symbolizes also a shift of the country’s strategic focus further to the East. An 
interesting development is the opening of a French naval base, an air base and a training 
camp hosting about 500 troops in May 2009 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—a 
country France has no colonial ties with. This step has been primarily motivated by 
French national interests: it increases the French military presence in a “geopolitical 
strategic location on a key oil supply route,” it improves France’s position in the 
competition for “lucrative defense and nuclear energy contracts in the oil-rich nation,” it 
sends signals to Teheran suggesting that the UAE are under French protection,117 and it 
underlines President Sarkozy’s goal of ensuring that France remains a major military and 
diplomatic power.118 From a different perspective the opening of the French base in Abu 
Dhabi can be also seen in the light of supporting the EU’s policies regarding energy 
security, piracy prevention, and cooperation with the Gulf States to build regional 
security.119 However, the bilateral approach suggests that advancing French national 
interests and the country’s freedom of action were the dominating factors in that process. 
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The 2003 ESS identified the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a strategic 
priority for Europe.120 The 2008 Livre Blanc addressed this conflict only by describing it 
as one of the major unsolved crises without elevating its resolution to a French security 
objective.121 Russia and the Balkans are highlighted in the Livre Blanc and the ESS as 
priorities, whereas the prevention of a major crisis in Asia remains a French concern not 
assumed by the European Union as a whole. 
3. Strategies and Concepts of Operation  
Crisis prevention using a broad variety of instruments is a theme that can be found 
in the ESS as well as in the Livre Blanc. Similar parallels can be identified in both 
documents regarding the importance of multilateral organizations such as the UN, NATO 
and the EU. France is committed to addressing international crises through international 
institutions—preferably through the EU—not only for reasons of legitimacy, but also 
because this approach amplifies French influence. Operation ARTEMIS in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo—the EU’s first autonomous mission—could have 
been also an exclusively French mission in support of the UN. France not only proposed 
the mission in 2003, backed by Britain, but it also deployed 1,785 out of a total of 2,200 
troops and provided the operational headquarters in Paris as well as the operational 
commander, General Bruno Neveux.122 But using ESDP as a vehicle to launch the 
operation demonstrated France’s will to work through the EU, and it also elevated the 
significance of the mission by representing almost 382 million Europeans (EU 15 in 
2003) instead of 60 million Frenchmen. According to the Livre Blanc,  
promoting the European Union as a global security actor on the one hand, 
and the construction of a legitimate and effective system of global 
governance on the other, are the necessary fulcrums for the defence of the 
major security interests of France.123  
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Reforming the UN Security Council is high on the French agenda to preserve it from 
becoming more irrelevant. Only an effective UN Security Council can be used to channel 
French interests.   
Despite France’s commitment to multilateralism the country does not rule out 
unilateral troop employment under reasonable conditions. The willingness to undertake 
unilateral action—if necessary—and the recent enormous emphasis on intelligence 
underline the importance of the long-standing French doctrine of freedom of action which 
contradicts to some extent France’s efforts to promote further institutional integration in 
ESDP. The profound reform ambitions outlined in the 2008 Livre Blanc also aim for 
increased capabilities to guarantee the country’s freedom of action. But seen from a 
different perspective, one could argue that France wants to live up to the demands for 
increased European capabilities made in the ESS. In other words, France leads by 
example by strengthening its national armed forces, and this ultimately increases the 
EU’s capabilities. Unfortunately, smaller EU member states cannot easily follow this 
example, as they face hard choices between maintaining balanced armed forces and 
pursuing specialization for the European defense project.124  
Despite the high financial burden it appears that there is a broad consensus among 
the French about the continuing utility of nuclear deterrence. It will remain a French 
national priority for the foreseeable future, although a role in the European context in the 
long term cannot be ruled out. 
Finally, the deployment of several thousand troops and civilian personnel around 
the globe under the aegis of the UN, NATO, and the EU underscores France’s 
determination to play an active role in international crisis management and reflects one 
aspect of French national identity—the notion that France has a special role in the 
world.125 France’s vision of an active and capable EU is echoed in the ESS and can be 
considered a projection of French national interests to the EU level. With major 
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contributions to ESDP missions as one powerful source of influence—among others—
Paris secures its leading position in ESDP, besides the two other key players: Britain and 
Germany.  
4. Contemporary Politics 
The country’s change in attitude towards the transatlantic relationship probably 
constitutes the most significant development in recent French thinking. Claudia Major, a 
research fellow at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, provides likely rationales 
behind the French policy shift:  
Given the modified international environment, the development of the 
Alliance and the French commitment in NATO operations, the argument 
goes, a further insistence upon a special case for France is neither coherent 
nor logical.126   
In the face of some serious domestic criticism the French President emphasized 
that the White Paper Commission had concluded that there were no obstacles for French 
full participation in NATO. But still, the role of Nicolas Sarkozy cannot be 
underestimated. When he took office in 2007, he was much more Atlanticist than his 
predecessor, with views similar to those of German chancellor Angela Merkel, who 
revived the U.S.-German transatlantic relationship beginning in 2005. While President 
Sarkozy wants to Europeanize the alliance, some positive implications for ESDP are also 
likely. The complete integration of France into the military structure of NATO might 
reduce the suspicion among the other European alliance members that thought that Paris 
intended to undermine the alliance.127 Further development in ESDP, and enhanced 
cooperation between NATO and the EU could be the consequences. 
The central themes of the French ESDP agenda since its emergence have been 
increased European military capabilities—intended to balance the United States in a 
multipolar world by fostering the EU’s international role—and enhanced European 
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planning capabilities. In pursuing the former objective, France has chosen a pragmatic 
approach based on projects that willing EU partners could agree on (e.g., only six EU 
member states intend to cooperate on space intelligence). In the absence of a European 
Union strategic vision—the French proposal for a new ESS was rejected—those small 
steps may eventually make the EU a more capable international actor.128 
D. CONCLUSION 
Despite the country’s enthusiasm for ESDP and its willingness to offer leadership, 
France’s sheer size in economic and demographic terms as well as its powerful military 
and its participation in most ESDP missions have been the major sources of French 
influence in ESDP. This significant influence helps to explain why French interests are to 
a great extent reflected in the ESS. However, French national priorities remain. The 
nuclear deterrent and the permanent seat in the UN Security Council support France’s 
self-image as a great power and underline the nation’s freedom of action. Additionally, 
France has certain security commitments vis-à-vis its overseas departments and 
territories, besides some long-standing bilateral security arrangements in Africa that are 
currently undergoing review. As a consequence of the shift in strategic focus, Paris 
intends to reduce the number of permanent bases in Africa while France has opened 
simultaneously a new base in the United Arab Emirates—a clear expression of Paris 
pursuing the national interest. Furthermore, the emphasis on improved intelligence 
capabilities and the proposed far-reaching military reforms are intended to guarantee 
France’s independent capacity in decision-making and the country’s freedom of 
action.129  To be sure, France is committed to multilateralism and ESDP, but Paris 
wants—as London does—to retain its freedom of action where the country’s national 
interest is at stake. Reconciling further integration in ESDP with France’s desire to 
maintain national independence will remain one of the major challenges for the 
foreseeable future. 
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Increasing France’s own capabilities through profound military reforms must be 
also seen as consistent with long-standing French ambitions to enhance the EU’s 
capabilities in order to raise the European Union’s international profile—as expressed in 
the ESS.130 France’s recent rapprochement with NATO can be also interpreted as another 
building-block in furthering the European Union’s defense project. Rejoining NATO’s 
military command structure is likely to improve France’s image among its European 
allies, and this could have positive implications for European security cooperation. 
Moreover, with France back in NATO, the transatlantic cycle of suspicion could come to 
an end; and the United States—with its focus shifting away from Europe anyway—might 
finally endorse the EU’s security and defense project without reservations.  
Although the creation of the EU operations centre can be considered only a partial 
success in improving the EU’s operation planning capabilities, and the rejection of the 
proposed preparation of a new ESS in 2008 by the other EU member states constituted a 
setback in an attempt to forge a strategic vision for ESDP, most other French measures 
(e.g., the proposal for the EU battlegroups and the EDA, and the initiation of several 
ESDP operations) were successfully geared towards ESDP progress in small steps. Thus, 
France has pursued the goal of strengthening the EU’s international position with Paris in 
a leading role. Charles de Gaulle once said that “France is the light of the world . . . its 
destiny is to illuminate the Universe.”131 As France lacks the economic, political and 
military clout of a great power, French leaders have sought to restore French influence in 
the world and to sustain the quest for grandeur through a leading role in the European 
Union. Here, besides strong French influence in many other policy domains of the EU, 
ESDP has been especially well suited due to its impact well beyond the European 
Union’s borders. 
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IV. GERMANY 
A. SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY BEFORE ST. MALO 
Germany’s unique experiences in the two world wars of the twentieth century 
have shaped the country’s post-1945 security culture as well as its security and defense 
policy. These experiences had a particularly dynamic impact on German foreign policy in 
the period from 1945–1998. 
The immediate priorities of West German policy-makers in the aftermath of 
World War II were security and reconciliation.  The security goal was satisfied by the 
Western occupation forces. Once the main concern for safety was assured, the process of 
advancing Adenauer’s “Westbindung” could begin.  This was the name given to West 
Germany’s strategy of reconciliation with wartime enemies and integration in Western 
Europe. These goals were seen as critical to the survival of West Germany. Once these 
priorities were solidified, West German leaders began to address their wish for German 
reunification.132  
In the 1950s, West Germany developed a foreign policy designed to reduce the 
restraints on the country and increase its political influence. NATO and the European 
integration movement provided the perfect platform. Helga Haftendorn, professor 
emeritus of political science and international relations at the Free University Berlin, has 
described the policies of the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany as follows: 
“By integrating their interests into those of the greater whole they learned to present their 
own aims and goals in a manner which Germany’s partners could accept as theirs.”133 
West Germany’s foreign policy behavior in the 1950s “involved a constant search for 
partners and allies, and the strict avoidance of nationale Alleingänge, or national 
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initiatives, without careful previous consultation.”134 The multilateral approach with its 
predictability and continuity became and still is one of the distinct characteristics of 
German foreign policy.135  
After the 1990 reunification, Poland and France were uncomfortable with the 
presence of a potentially powerful and ambitious sovereign Germany. The Kohl 
administration addressed these concerns and “promised continuity” and this “meant, 
above all, a foreign policy working towards freedom and peace and based on the rule of 
law and the welfare of humanity,”136 writes Haftendorn. In her view, “Its [Germany’s] 
foreign policy credo was the antithesis of classic power politics.”137 
In 1996, Gunther Hellmann, professor of political science at the University of 
Frankfurt am Main, indicated that Germany would probably pursue the “Wider West” 
strategy. This strategy focused on stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany 
pursued this policy throughout the 1990s, seeking a further “deepening” and “widening” 
of multilateral institutions.138 This trend seems to have reversed recently as German 
policy-makers have moved closer to the French-British position. Both London and Paris 
currently reject any supranational integration in ESDP that would limit their freedom of 
action.139 
Haftendorn describes the European integration policy of the era in which Helmut 
Kohl served as Chancellor (1982–1998) as follows: “The Federal Republic first accepted 
its partners’ priorities and then modeled their implementation according to its own 
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preferences. It practiced self-assertion through self-restraint.”140 Gebhard Schweigler, a 
German political scientist, argued in 1996 that “the ‘culture of restraint’ . . . inhibited a 
wider debate about German national interests much beyond European integration and 
alliance solidarity.”141 Dealing with the “culture of restraint” was and still is one of the 
major challenges for the matured trading state.142 Germany is still trying to find the right 
balance between assertiveness and restraint, between becoming too dominant in 
international affairs and being too reluctant to accept responsibility.143 This tension and 
Germany’s aversion to the use of force are the root causes of a substantial gap between 
the ambitions of German policy-makers—a permanent United Nations Security Council 
seat, the transformation of the Bundewehr (the federal armed forces), and a more 
proactive role in world politics—and their actual capabilities.144  
Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany’s—and Europe’s—
security environment changed fundamentally. The former existential, communist threat 
was gone; and the reunited Germany was suddenly surrounded by partners and allies for 
the first time in history. Soon it became evident that the newly gained security in Europe 
could not be taken for granted and that new security challenges on the periphery of 
Europe and beyond required attention. Although Germany was heavily preoccupied with 
domestic politics in the aftermath of reunification, the country’s allies and partners called 
upon Berlin to accept greater responsibilities in meeting new international security 
challenges. While Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher sent only checks to 
Germany’s allies during the first Gulf War in 1990–1991, the Constitutional Court ruling 
in 1994 cleared the path for the employment of German armed forces abroad under the 
following conditions: a) authorization by the German parliament; b) compliance with 
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international law; c) use of force for primarily humanitarian reasons;145 and d) 
participation in a multinational coalition. After decades of importing security under the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella, German security and defense policy shifted to exporting security 
on the lower end of the Petersberg tasks spectrum.146 
B. SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY PRIORITIES AFTER ST. MALO 
Britain and France, in December 1998, released the St. Malo declaration, and 
Germany held the EU presidency during the first six months of 1999.  German Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer took the leading role and used the momentum from St. Malo to 
bundle together key proposals for a European Security and Defense Policy. The 
diplomatic advances during the Kosovo conflict and the genesis of ESDP in Cologne in 
June 1999 made the German EU presidency in the first semester of 1999 a success.147 
The emergence of ESDP can be considered a milestone in European integration history. 
ESDP provided the member nations of the European Union with new foreign policy 
options, and this was especially true for Germany.  
With no permanent presence in the UN Security Council and NATO primarily 
designed for collective defense and non-Article 5 operations in the upper spectrum of the 
Petersberg tasks, Germany’s options were limited. The ESDP offered the possibility for 
German politicians to actively participate in the European Union’s decision-making 
process before presenting a proposal for the employment of German troops to the 
Bundestag. The ESDP approach of effective multilateralism, with “the full spectrum of 
instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention” to tackle security threats, fits 
well with German preferences.148 This raises an interesting question: With Germany as 
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one of the main drivers behind the European integration process, does the country, 
nevertheless, have a national security and defense policy agenda? If so, to what extent are 
Germany’s national objectives visible in its ESDP agenda? 
1. Threats Identified 
Germany’s 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG) basically identify the same 
major threats (terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, organized 
crime) as the 2003 ESS. Despite these new security challenges, Germany’s security 
situation has improved dramatically since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
For the foreseeable future, the German paper concludes, there are no signs that Germany 
will be threatened by conventional forces.149 In the White Paper 2006, additional threats 
are highlighted, such as migration, energy security, epidemics and pandemics, and 
increasing piracy. Most of these threats are now reflected in the 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the ESS. The ESS identifies primarily the Middle East, Asia and 
Africa as the most likely origins of crises and threats. 
2. Security Objectives 
The German White Paper 2006 identifies a variety of broad interests and security 
goals in terms similar to those employed in the ESS and the preamble of the Treaty on 
European Union: 
 Preserving justice and freedom, democracy, security and prosperity 
for the citizens of our country and protecting them from dangers; 
 Ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of German territory; 
 Preventing regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany’s 
security, wherever possible, and helping to control crises; 
 Confronting global challenges, above all the threat posed by 
international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD; 
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 Helping to uphold human rights and strengthen the international 
order on the basis of international law.150 
Additionally, the White Paper 2006 highlights a few specific objectives:  
 A close and trusting relationship with the United States 
 A European area of stability 
 A proactive EU neighborhood policy with states of Eastern Europe, southern 
Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean region 
 A lasting and durable partnership with Russia151   
The document also addresses the importance of stability in other regions, such as 
the Balkans and the Middle East. All of the above mentioned security objectives can be 
also found in the ESS, although the ESS stresses clearly the solution of the Arab/Israeli 
conflict as a strategic priority for Europe and the key to tackling other problems in the 
Middle East. The three overarching strategic objectives as outlined in the ESS are: 
 Addressing the threats 
 Building security in our neighborhood 
 An international order based on effective multilateralism152 
Under these broad aims, the ESS defines several specific goals that are mostly reflected 
in the German White Paper 2006, although sometimes with the main focus on different 
issues. This short comparison suggests that Germany’s national interests have been 






                                                 
150  White Paper 2006 - on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, ed. Federal 
Ministery of Defence, 2006), 21. 
151  Ibid. 
152 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 8–12. 
 51
In contrast, the definition of distinctively German national priorities in security 
and defense policy is difficult as the current debate about German national interests 
shows.153 Germany’s foreign policy of self-restraint and its preference to work through 
multilateral institutions since World War II have certainly contributed to the fact that the 
country now has difficulties in defining its national interests. Christian Hacke, a professor 
at the Institute for Political Science and Sociology in Bonn, has argued that Berlin needs 
to ultimately develop a foreign policy strategy with a security and defense component 
that reflects German interests and simultaneously contributes to stability in the world.154 
Adding to this challenge, Stefan Fröhlich, a professor of international politics at the 
university in Erlangen, has observed that German interests get their bearings from  
security objectives. In his view, in today’s security environment of asymmetrical threats 
and failing states it has become more difficult to define national priorities and shape the 
international world order according to one’s own preferences.155   
As one of the major industrialized trading powers in the world, Germany depends 
heavily on the import of raw materials and sources of energy and on the benefits of free 
trade. These issues are just as central to its national interests as security for its citizens. 
The challenge for Germany is that it is incapable of pursuing such goals unilaterally. As 
Helga Haftendorn has pointed out: 
Germany has become a big power and is no longer just a consumer, but a 
producer of international order. However, Germany cannot provide order 
by itself. Its enlightened self-interest demands that it cooperate with 
partners and allies, espousing a “never alone” policy and a continuing 
wariness of solitary courses. There is no central German interest that can 
be realized without joining force with other states.156 
                                                 
153  Hans W. Maull, "Nationale Interessen! Aber was sind sie?" Internationale Politik 61, no. 10 
(2006), 62–76. Christian Hacke, "Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime für die Außenpolitik 
Deutschlands" Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, eds. Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause, Vol. 3 Interessen 
und Strategien (Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), 3–13. Schweigler, The Legacy of History and Germany's Future 
Role in International Politics, 3–19.  
154  Hacke, Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime für die Außenpolitik Deutschlands, 3–13, 5. 
155  Stefan Fröhlich, "Deutsche Außen und Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen der EU," Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, no. 43 (20 October 2008), 15–21, 16. 
156  Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, 412. 
 52
Europe’s need for energy security and the dependence of global trade on free sea 
routes was further highlighted by the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of 
the European Security Strategy.  In support of the goals laid out in the ESS, the EU 
launched its first maritime ESDP mission to tackle the piracy problem off the Somali 
coast. With respect to the EU’s energy dependence, scholars emphasize the need for more 
cooperation among EU member states to increase their bargaining power, and suggest 
that it is time to rethink Germany’s abandonment of nuclear energy.157 There should not 
be any major obstacles preventing the formulation of a common energy policy when most 
other German security and defense interests, and even values and principles, are already 
embedded within the European Union’s policies. With respect to Germany’s economic 
interests in the mid 1990s, Schweigler wrote that, “should Germany impinge severely on 
the security interests or human rights concerns of its major allies (such as in its politics 
towards China or Iran), Germany is more than likely to pull back. Alliance values and 
solidarity will count more than commercial gains.”158 Although it must be acknowledged 
that Germany today is much more self-assertive than the “infant” reunified Germany of 
the mid 1990s, the core of Schweigler’s argument remains valid. 
3. Strategies and Concepts of Operation 
Germany’s approach to the use of force within a multinational framework and in 
accordance with a UN Security Council authorization is consistent with the EU approach. 
The White Paper 2006 and the ESS stress that emerging threats abroad often must be 
dealt with by early preventive measures involving a broad range of instruments, before a 
crisis can fully develop.159 Even Germany is aware that sometimes military action is 
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required to tackle a security problem abroad before it reaches Europe’s borders.160 For 
this reason Berlin has been transforming the Bundeswehr from a Cold War force into a 
twenty-first century expeditionary force.  
The German White Paper 2006 states: 
German security policy is based on a comprehensive concept of 
security; it is forward-looking and multilateral. Security cannot be 
guaranteed by the efforts of any one nation or by armed forces 
alone. Instead, it requires an all-encompassing approach that can 
only be developed in networked security structures and within the 
context of a comprehensive national and global security 
philosophy. One of its components is the Federal Government’s 
overall concept of Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, 
and Post-Conflict Peace Building.161 
Like the ESS, the German White Paper 2006 also emphasizes the use of all 
available instruments—diplomatic, economic, development policy, policing measures, 
and military—when addressing a threat. Before German soldiers participate in an armed 
operation, the German government examines “in each individual case what German 
values and interests require the operational involvement of the Bundeswehr.”162 The 
approval of the Bundestag is required before the government can employ German troops 
abroad. This increases public acceptance of such operations. 
The German people have been especially sensitive regarding the use of force by 
German troops. In the words of Christoph O. Meyer, the author of a recent study on 
strategic culture in Europe:  
German public opinion is very concerned not to cause foreign casualties, 
be they military or civilian, and thus shies away from all kinds of military 
missions, which would involve the high end of using force. Interestingly, 
in German strategic culture, foreign casualties can be as difficult to digest 
as own casualties since they raise the trauma of guilt and self-induced 
downfall.163  
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German decision-makers often face the dilemma of respecting those domestic 
constraints and responding to the call of allies to accept greater responsibilities. This 
results in compromise policies. For example, German troops have been deployed under 
certain caveats—often to the dismay of coalition partners. Despite deploying its forces 
with restrictions in some operations, Germany has come a long way from the first NATO 
peacekeeping missions in the 1990s to participating in several operations in 2009 
involving 7,400 servicemen.164  It remains unclear to what extent German domestic 
constraints have had an impact on the EU’s objective to enhance the EU’s overall 
military capability.  
Aside from caveats, Germany’s ability to provide desired military capabilities in 
support of EU objectives is also constrained by another factor. For historical reasons, and 
with strong support from the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Christian Social 
Union (CSU), the Federal Republic of Germany has retained conscription.165 According 
to Paul Belkin, 
   critics call for a voluntary, fully professional force, arguing that the 
[operational] constraints placed on conscripts—they can only be deployed 
abroad on a volunteer basis—lead to significant operational deficiencies in 
the armed services. While conscription is suited for defense of national 
territory, they argue, it impedes Germany’s ability to meet its 
peacekeeping and stabilization obligations abroad by wasting scarce 
financial resources to fulfill outdated security goals.166  
These disadvantages constrain the Bundeswehr from becoming more capable, flexible 
and mobile, as requested by the ESS.  
Despite Germany’s commitment to carry European integration forward, the 
relatively small defense budget of the Bundeswehr (in relation to Germany’s GDP) slows 
down the transformation process of the German armed forces. This in turn could have a 
negative impact on the country’s contribution to the enhancement of the EU’s military 
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capability. Since the beginning of the new millennium, German defense spending has 
averaged around 1.4 percent of the country’s GDP. With defense spending of 1.3 percent 
of GDP in 2007, the German investment is 0.4 percent below the EU’s average (see 
Table 3).  
Table 3.   Defense Expenditure in Relation to GDP 
 
According to Belkin, ”Observers generally commend Germany’s stated intention 
to transform its military to meet EU, NATO and UN commitments, but point to 
substantial gaps between stated goals and actions taken.”168 Although public opinion 
about the Bundeswehr is positive, policy-makers cannot justify an increase in defense 
spending during times of welfare state and pension system reforms, and economic 
downturns.169 According to a survey conducted by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social 
Science, in the years from 1998 to 2008 an average of 27.4 percent of German citizens 
supported an increase in the Bundeswehr budget, while 21 percent opposed any budget 
increase and 51.6 percent wanted to maintain the defense expenditure at the then-current 
level.170 The same survey reported relatively strong support for the Bundeswehr’s main 
overseas operations (see Table 4).  
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 European Union Britain France Germany 
2007 (2004) Defense Expenditure as a 
Percentage of GDP 
1.69 (1.51) 2.49 (2.3) 2.34 (2.5) 1.28 (1.4) 
2007 GDP in Trillion US$ 14.66 2.215 2.083 2.816 
2007 GDP per Capita in US$ 33,400 36,500 33,300 34,900 
Sources: Author’s compilation.167 
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Table 4.   Approval Rates for Bundeswehr Overseas Mission 2005 to 2008 
 2005 2005 2007 2008 
Peacekeeping troops under UN mandate in Afghanistan (ISAF) 64 49 60 64 
NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo (KFOR) 75 62 70 70 
EU peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) 68 63 70 70 
Source: Thomas Buhlmann, Sozialwissenschafliches Institute der Bundeswehr.171 
Note: The question asked for the survey was: “Please, tell me whether you approve or disapprove the Bundeswehr’s 
participation on the following missions.” The values (in percent) displayed here are the sum of the votes responding to 
the question with “totally agree,” “predominantly agree” and “ rather agree.” 
 
In contrast, other sources paint a different picture when it comes to approval rates 
for German military participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The magazine 
Stern reported in July 2009 that 61 percent (59 percent in 2008) of the German people 
want the Bundeswehr to leave Afghanistan. According to the 3 July 2009 Focus, 55 
percent (52 percent in 2008) did not approve of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan. 
Although the approval rates for Bundeswehr participation in the ISAF mission show a 
significant discrepancy depending on the source, the bottom line is that a majority of 
German citizens do not want to spend more money on defense, despite the increasing 
pressure on German policy-makers by the country’s allies.  
It is noteworthy that most German troops deployed abroad participate in 
operations outside the ESDP framework such as KFOR and ISAF, under NATO’s lead, 
or UNIFIL, a UN mission (see Table 5).172 Despite UNFIL, where German naval vessels 
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Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, notes that “the German priority 
is still clearly placed on peacekeeping and peacemaking (post-conflict reconstruction) 
missions,” such as KFOR and ISAF.173 
Table 5.   Military Personnel Participating in Selected Operations under  
UN, NATO and EU Auspices 
 
Although in smaller numbers than those provided by some other EU nations, 
Germany has contributed troops to all six military ESDP missions so far, including 
EUFOR RD Congo, which was under the lead of German General Karl-Heinz Viereck 
and headquartered in Potsdam. An analysis of the data in Table 6 shows, on the one hand, 
Germany’s general willingness to contribute troops to military ESDP operations. On the 
other hand, German troops were deployed in a relatively safe environment in both Congo 
missions while mainly French troops played the chief part. Although Germany’s lack of 
                                                 
173  Marco Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," Abstract. SAIS Review 25, 
no. 2 (2005), 27–41, 35. 
174 http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article3645#France-s-Participation-in-PKOs (accessed 8 
September 2009), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN (accessed 8 
September 2009). Daniel Dombey and James Blitz, “UK agony over Afghanistan raises Washington,” 
Financial Times, 16 July 2009, 5. http://www.nato.int/KFOR/ (accessed 9 September 2009). 
Leading Organization Operation Britain France Germany 





















Sources:Authors compilation.174  
Notes: 1) The operation EUNAFOR Atalanta is led by a British Commander from the Operational Headquarters in 
Northwoods/United Kingdom. Exact number of British military personnel involved in the operation is unknown. 
* estimated number. 
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national interest in Central Africa limited its role in the operations, certainly concerns 
about the use of force and German casualties helped to shape its deployment policy. 
Table 6.   Military ESDP Operations and German Contributions 
 
Berlin has seconded civilian personnel to 11 out of the 13 civilian ESDP missions. 
The overall size of Germany’s civilian contributions to ESDP operations has in general 
been small (that is, from two to 180 personnel) in accordance with the limited magnitude 
of these operations (from ten to 1,800 personnel from EU nations). In 2008, the largest 
civilian EU mission was launched. The EULEX police mission in Kosovo consists of 
about 1,800 EU experts, including judges, public prosecutors, and police and customs 
officers. Germany contributes about 180 officials. 
 
Operation Objective German contribution 
ARTEMIS RD Congo 
2003 
Stabilization of security and 
improvement of the humanitarian 
situation in Bunia. 
Strategic Lift via C-160 and 
MEDEVAC Airbus in alert. 
CONCORDIA Macedonia 
2003 
Provide security for international 
observers in Macedonia (FYROM). 
Total troops: 350 
40 German soldiers on the ground. 
EUFOR Althea 
since 2004 
Stabilizing of security in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Total troops 2500 
235 German soldiers on the ground 
(in 2007). 
EUFOR RD Congo 
2006 
Support MONUC in stabilizing the 
country. Total troops: 2300 
100 German soldiers in Kinshasa. 
680 standing by in Gabon. 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
2008 
Contribute to protecting civilians in 
danger, particularly refugees and 
displaced persons.  
4 (assumed to be observers) 
EU NAFOR Atlanta 
2008 
To contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast. 
German naval vessels with 230 
German military personnel. 
Sources: Author’s compilation from official EU and Bundeswehr websites. 
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4. Contemporary Politics 
Certain decisions by policy-makers in the German government provide evidence 
of their views regarding national interests. In 1998, Gerhard Schröder became chancellor 
and Germany soon assumed a more self-assertive role in world politics. The new 
government obviously sought closer cooperation with Moscow, as with the Russian-
German gas pipeline project through the Baltic Sea. This project has certainly had an 
economic motivation, but at the same time it is related to energy security. In 2003, 
Schröder sided with French President Jacques Chirac and some other European heads of 
government, and together they refused to provide troops to support the U.S.-led invasion 
of Iraq. Besides the well known domestic policy rationale, the main rationale for the 
chancellor not to send the Bundeswehr was simply that German troops were not allowed 
to participate in what he considered an aggressive war. Moreover, it is doubtful whether 
the Bundestag would have approved a proposal to send German troops to participate in 
combat operations in Iraq. 
When Angela Merkel came to office in 2005, one of her highest priorities was to 
revive the traditionally good U.S.-German relationship. The Merkel government has also 
sought to shape EU policy and offer leadership with a strategic purpose in mind—the 
European Union’s self-assertion.175 Chancellor Merkel successfully averted the creation 
of a Mediterranean Union excluding northern European EU members by mobilizing other 
non-Mediterranean EU member states. When the Russia-Georgia crisis broke out in 
2008, she carried through a diplomacy that prevented the imposition of harsh sanctions 
on Russia.176 Stability in Central and Eastern Europe as well as good relations with 
Russia are in the interest of Germany and the EU. According to the 2006 White Paper, 
“Without Russia, security, stability, integration, and prosperity in Europe cannot be 
 
 
                                                 
175 Gunther Hellmann, "Fordernder Multilateralismus," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 29 (4 
February 2009), 7–7, 7.  
176 Ibid., 7.  
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guaranteed.”177 Germany also participates in the “P5 plus 1” negotiations with Iran.178  
This elevates Berlin’s status by sending the indirect message that Britain and France 
alone cannot represent the EU’s interests.179  
The German position with respect to Atlanticist Britain and Europeanist France 
has usually been a pivotal one somewhere in between, depending on the issue.180 Since 
Germany assumed a more proactive international role beginning in the 1990s, German-
American relations have been shifting “from a relationship based on the acceptance of 
American leadership towards one of a collaboration among equal partners.”181 Regarding 
the NATO-EU relationship, Germany has always favored close ties with NATO and the 
current German administration has emphasized the importance of the Alliance for 
Europe’s security in the 2006 White Paper. Simultaneously, Berlin wants to strengthen 
the European Union’s security capabilities through cooperation among Europeans—
especially the civilian instruments of crisis management—without jeopardizing the trans-
Atlantic alliance. 182  
Traditionally, the EU member states have had high expectations when Germany 
has held the EU presidency. As one of the main drivers behind the integration process, 
Berlin is usually expected to build compromises, find solutions and launch new 
initiatives.183 Important achievements of the German EU presidency in 2007 include:   
 The adoption of a Central Asia strategy with the focus on security, 
environment and energy cooperation, as well as the promotion of rule of 
law, democracy, and human rights;  
                                                 
177 White Paper 2006 - on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 47. 
178 The “P5 plus 1” consist of the five countries holding permanent UN Security Council seats and 
Germany. The  negotiations deal with the Iranian nuclear program. 
179  Hellmann, Fordernder Multilateralismus, 7–7, 7.  
180  Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West, 1st 
ed. (New York: Random House, 2004), 286, 63.  
181  Hubert Zimmermann, "Security Exporters: Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic 
Cooperation" In The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress - US-European Relations After Iraq, ed. David M. 
Andrews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 128–151, 129. 
182  Siedschlag, Germany: From a Reluctant Power to a Constructive Power? 46–68, 60. Overhaus, 
German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past, 27–41, 29. 
183  Hilz, Deutschlands EU-Präsidentschaft 2007 - Integrationspolitische Akzente in schwierigen 
Zeiten, 29, 8. 
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 The emphasis on climate change and its impact on international security, 
which has now been addressed in the December 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the ESS;  
 The preparation of a civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo (EULEX became 
operational in December 2008);  
 The launch of EUPOL Afghanistan; the creation of a civil headquarters for 
the planning and conduct of civil ESDP operations;  
 The impulse to enhance the EU’s military, strategic, and planning 
capabilities;  
 An agreement about the first U.S. participation in a civil ESDP mission 
(Kosovo).184 
C. ANALYSIS  
Germany’s security and defense policy priorities are almost entirely reflected in 
the ESS. What factors may explain this similarity in priorities? 
1. Threats Identified 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union the EU has ruled out the possibility of 
large-scale aggression against one of its member states. Instead the European Union of 
the post-Cold War era faces a new set of threats “which are more diverse, less visible and 
less predictable.”185 The terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, the Iranian 
nuclear program and failing states in Africa lead to further convergence of European 
threat perceptions. With Germany at the heart of Europe, its security is indivisibly linked 
to the EU’s security and vice versa.  
2. Security Objectives 
Germany’s security objectives are similar to those of the EU as a whole. Berlin 
certainly has security preferences. These preferences include stability in Central and 
Eastern Europe, good relations with Russia, free trade routes, and reliable energy 
 
                                                 
184  Die Bundesregierung, Europa gelingt gemeinsam - Bilanz der deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft, 
2007), www.auswaertiges-amt.de (accessed 14 March 2009), 4. 
185 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 5. 
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supplies. However, those are goals of the EU as a whole. When other European Union 
countries have unique interests such as those of Greece in the Aegean Sea and France in 
Djibouti, why does Germany lack exclusively national interests?  
According to Hans-Peter Schwarz, a German historian and political scientist well 
known for his biography of Adenauer, the reunified Germany is a postmodern nation, 
“purged of the most virulent characteristics of nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
nationalism: cultivation of historical myths and old hatreds, folk ideology, a tribal 
mentality, and religious intolerance.” In his view, ”this reunified Germany bases its idea 
of nationhood primarily on popular sovereignty and a sense of shared history, language, 
and culture.”186 Throughout the Cold War the Federal Republic of Germany developed a 
culture of restraint regarding the threat or use of force. In 1990, the Treaty on the Final 
Settlement with Respect to Germany, inter alia, settled the Oder-Neisse line as the final 
border between Germany and Poland, preventing any future discussion about the 
boundaries of German territory. After the reunification the Kohl government changed 
Article 23 of the German Basic Law and thereby expressed Germany’s commitment to 
the development of the EU and the realization of a united Europe.187 This was a symbolic 
act undertaken in the light of German aggression twice in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and intended to “limit its [Germany’s] own autonomy and to function as a unit of 
the EU.”188 Schwarz cites an advisor of Helmut Kohl: “The Staatsräson [raison d'État] of 
a united Germany is its integration in Europe.” Schwarz concludes, “by this step the 
                                                 
186  Hans-Peter Schwarz and Deborah Lucas Schneider, "Germany's National and European Interests," 
Daedalus 123, no. 2, Europe through a Glass Darkly (Spring 1994), 81–105, 103. 
187 In the 1949 Basic Law, Article 23 was called the Beitrittsartikel, that is the article of accession. 
The original Article 23 read as follows: For now, this Basic Law is legal in the territory of the federal states 
of Baden, Bayern, Bremen, Groß-Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. It shall 
become legal in other German territories following their accession. After Germany’s reunification in 1990 
this wording in the article was deleted, and in 1992 the Kohl administration introduced new language in 
Article 23 recognizing Germany’s role in Europe. Today, Article 23 of the Basic Law reads as follows: 
“With a view to establishing a united Europe the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the 
development of the European Union, which is committed to democratic, rule-of-law, social and federal 
principles as well as the principle of subsidiarity, and ensures protection of basic rights comparable in 
substance to that afforded by this Basic Law.”  Translation of the 1949 Article 23 by the author based on 
the following source: http://www.chronikderwende.de/lexikon/glossar/glossar_jsp/key=art23.html 
(accessed 14 October 2009). Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. (Berlin: Deutscher 
Bundestag, January 2007), 24. 
188 Schwarz, "Germany's National and European Interests," 81–105, 84. 
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virtual equation of German and European interests . . . was anchored in the 
constitution.”189 This discussion goes to the roots in explaining why Germany is short of 
distinctively national interests. 
3. Strategies and Concepts of Operation 
Germany’s preference to employ all available civilian crisis management 
instruments before using force is reflected in the ESS. One of the policy implications of 
the ESS is the requirement for more capable forces and more resources for defense. Here 
German national interests become visible in the sense that the goals of the EU member 
states expressed in the ESS are inconsistent with policy-makers’ actions. Relatively low 
defense spending and armed forces based on conscription are not consistent with the goal 
of a capable and flexible expeditionary Bundeswehr. The budgetary constraints on the 
Ministry of Defense are unlikely to be relaxed due to the government’s spending 
priorities in other policy domains. Moreover, conscription is still broadly supported, 
despite increasing criticism. 
The White Paper 2006 emphasizes that Germany “safeguards its security interests 
primarily in international and supranational institutions and plays an active role in 
shaping their policies.”190 In a complementary observation, Hacke points out that 
Germany, with its geographical position, depends on functioning multilateral 
structures.191 In the end, is the preservation of effective multilateral institutions 
Germany’s genuine national interest? One incentive for the European integration 
movement has always been to contain German might. Germans, out of a possible 
sentiment of guilt, agreed. By intertwining German power in a multidimensional net 
(political, economic, and military) with other European countries, German policy-makers 
wanted to rule out any further aggression towards their country’s neighbors. For this 
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reason and many others, Germany’s interest is to keep European, Euro-Atlantic and 
global international institutions strong and the member states committed to working 
through them, instead of pursuing exclusively national objectives.  
4. Contemporary Politics 
Two central interests of German security and defense policy are also vital for the 
EU’s security as well: stability in Central and Eastern Europe with good relations with 
Russia as a core element, and a strong and committed transatlantic relationship. The 
European Security Strategy takes these objectives into account because the EU as a 
whole has recognized that stability in the East and maintaining the alliance with the 
United States are important for the EU’s security. The Russian-Georgian crisis in 2008 
may have convinced the last skeptics in the EU. 
Additionally, Germany became more self-assertive during the last decade—an 
attitude which was projected to the EU level. Chancellor Schröder’s “no” during the Iraq 
crisis in 2003, the desire for a permanent UN Security Council seat, the participation in 
the Iran negotiations along with the five permanent UN Security Council members, and 
the call for a more balanced partnership with the United States, typify Berlin’s matured 
self-assertiveness. Germany’s participation in most of the 22 ESDP missions underlines 
the country’s willingness and capability—although limited—to take responsibility in 
international security issues.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Germany’s interests are to a great extent reflected in ESDP because the EU’s 
security and Germany’s security are indivisible. One EU member cannot be insecure 
without the others being insecure. German national interests beyond the desire for peace 
and stability have been washed away by history. Instead, the European integration project 
has become a genuine priority as grounded in the revision of the German Basic Law after 
reunification in 1990. Intertwining the European states economically, politically and 
militarily has meant the end of the era of violent rivalry in Europe. Understandably, 
Germany has significant influence in ESDP. 
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Germany has the biggest economy, the second largest military,192 and significant 
political weight in the EU, providing for a good amount of bargaining power in ESDP 
decision-making bodies. This is highlighted by the fact that Britain, France, and Germany 
occasionally pre-negotiate initiatives before they are discussed at the EU level. Britain 
and France, with their colonial backgrounds, military capabilities and lower thresholds 
when it comes to the use of force, do not necessarily represent the views of all EU 
member states. In the trilateral discussions, Germany serves as a representative of EU 
member states that are less willing to send troops abroad. The pre-negotiated proposal 
thus becomes more balanced and is more likely to be adopted by the EU member states. 
If this trilateral cooperation were institutionalized, London, Paris, and Berlin could 
provide effective leadership for ESDP.193 
Although the rhetoric of German policy-makers suggests that they are committed 
to the goals set out in the ESS, their action falls short of the expectations created by some 
policy statements. Primarily due to domestic constraints, the government cannot support 
Germany’s political, diplomatic and economic weight in international affairs with a 
corresponding military weight. While the ESS has called for more capable forces and 
increased defense budgets, Germany has retained conscription and has remained reluctant 
to increase the defense budget significantly. In other words, although Germany’s security 
and defense agenda parallels that of the EU, the implementation of the changes required 
to fully support the ESS has been limited by national politics.  
Finally, there is no security and defense policy agenda that Germany pursues on a 
unilateral basis. In addition to constitutional restrictions on military operations, there are 
at least two reasons that explain this outcome. First, from a historical perspective the 
Federal Republic of Germany is known for its restrained foreign policy. With only 
limited sovereignty throughout the Cold War, the country worked skillfully through 
international institutions and thereby achieved its desired goals indirectly. To a great 
extent Germany has been the epitome of multilateral policy-making, although Berlin 
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became much more self-assertive when Gerhard Schröder served as chancellor between 
1998 and 2005. Second, in the post 9/11 security environment, “no single country is able 
to tackle today’s complex problems on its own,” as emphasized in the ESS.194 This 
circumstance—combined with Germany’s domestic conditions (the pacifist attitude of 
the German people and constitutional requirements for troop deployments within a 
multinational coalition)—means that there are no incentives left for policy-makers to 
pursue a unilateral security and defense policy. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. ANALYSIS 
Since its emergence following the historic December 1998 British-French St. 
Malo declaration, the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy has evolved. 
Individual EU member states often have formed small “coalitions” based on common 
interests before they have launched major initiatives—such as the EU battle groups, the 
European Defence Agency or the EU Operations Centre—intended to improve ESDP. 
The key players in that process have often been Britain, France and Germany. Although 
numerous national priorities of London, Paris and Berlin are reflected in the ESS, some 
distinct national priorities remain. What follows is an analysis of commonalities and 
differences among British, French and German security preferences. What national 
interests are reflected in ESDP and which national priorities cannot be reconciled with 
the EU’s agenda? 
1. Threats Identified  
The threat assessments of London, Paris, and Berlin show a broad consensus 
regarding the major security threats to their countries and the European Union. As 
already outlined in the 2003 ESS, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, 
state failure and organized crime remain the major concerns of Britain, France, and 
Germany in their recently published security documents. Frequently mentioned are also 
migration, competition for energy, epidemics and pandemics, climate change, poverty 
and globalization as factors with implications for global security. All three countries also 
rule out a large-scale conventional attack by individual countries or a coalition directed 
against their country or the European Union in the foreseeable future. Despite this wide 
agreement on the key threats, at least one major example must be highlighted where the 
emphasis of the British NSS, the French Livre Blanc and the German White Paper are at 
variance. 
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While the NSS notes only briefly the power politics of Russia and China as they 
use energy supply as a foreign policy tool, the Livre Blanc addresses Moscow’s return to 
Realpolitik more frankly. Paris expresses openly its concerns about Russia’s attempts to 
restore its status as a major power via increased military spending and other measures. 
With Russia playing a traditional key role in European security, Russia-EU relations are 
addressed in the 2003 ESS and the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the 
ESS. But the view expressed in the ESS is much more moderate as it takes the more 
cautious stance of countries such as Germany into account. The German White Paper 
makes no reference to Russia in its threat assessment but rather emphasizes the need for 
lasting security cooperation with Russia. This can be, in part, explained by Germany’s 
foreign policy culture of restraint and its determination not to alienate or antagonize other 
countries but also by its more exposed geopolitical position compared to Britain and 
France. 
The bottom line, however, is that the general threat perception of Britain, France 
and Germany is quite similar; and this provides an essential foundation for further 
integration in ESDP. According to Andrew Shearer, former Senior Advisor to the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet of Australia: “Shared perceptions of external risks are 
fundamental to the development of group identities and of political and security 
communities.”195 While a shared threat perception certainly helps to formulate European 
Union security policies, the individual security priorities of London, Paris, and Berlin 
become more obvious once the countries’ security objectives are compared. 
2. Security Objectives 
In addition to defending their common values, territorial defense and the 
protection of their citizens are the paramount common goals of Britain, France and 
Germany. But, unlike Germany with its coherent territory at the heart of Mitteleuropa, 
Britain and France still have continuing security responsibilities in numerous overseas 
territories due to their colonial legacies. Germany was deprived of its overseas colonies 
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as a consequence of the outcome of World War I.196 This discrepancy between Germany 
on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other has had important implications. 
First, throughout the Cold War and to the present day the British and French armed forces 
have had a global presence requiring expeditionary capabilities, whereas Germany began 
the transformation of the Bundeswehr with a view to power projection only in the 1990s. 
Until then the Bundeswehr was almost exclusively trained and equipped for territorial 
defense. Second, in part due to their overseas territories but also due to security 
arrangements with certain former colonies, London and Paris developed a security culture 
distinct from that of Berlin with regard to military intervention and the use of force. In 
the end, the British and French continuing overseas commitments provide a 
comprehensible rationale explaining the countries’ emphasis on freedom of action and 
the capacity to act independently. These will remain national priorities for the foreseeable 
future as they are not reflected in the ESS. It is unlikely that the two countries would 
agree on any EU integration steps that could undermine their freedom of action. 
In contrast, the German position is the opposite due to constitutional 
requirements, limited capabilities and the belief in multilateralism. As the German armed 
forces will be deployed only in multilateral frameworks (e.g., NATO, the UN, and the 
EU), Berlin has no desire to retain a capacity to act independently in this regard. Despite 
the fact already pointed out earlier by Helga Haftendorn that “[t]here is no central 
German interest that can be realized without joining forces with other states,” German 
foreign policy is geared towards multilateral institutions.197 NATO and the EU have not 
only provided security for their member nations, but Germany has successfully promoted 
its interests through these institutions. Keeping European, Euro-Atlantic and global 
international institutions strong and the member states committed to working through 
them is a genuine German security objective which is reflected in the emphasis on 
effective multilateralism in the ESS. Functional multilateral institutions are a supreme 
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Littlefield, 2006), 412. 
 70
German priority qualitatively distinct from the British and the French declared 
commitment to multilateralism as both countries keep a backdoor open by maintaining 
their independent capacity to act whenever their national interest is at stake. Finally, 
Germany’s security is inseparably linked to the EU’s security with apparently no security 
objectives left that the country pursues unilaterally. 
Stability in Central and Eastern Europe has been a major security objective of 
London, Paris and Berlin, but Britain and Germany supported the EU’s enlargement to 
improve stability in this region in 2004 and 2007 more actively than France did. 
Germany’s geostrategic position has in particular improved dramatically owing to the 
accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and other neighbors. France in contrast has been 
concerned about its diminishing power in the EU as the center of gravity has shifted 
eastward. In the view of France, in the future the accession of new members (e.g., Balkan 
states) must be guided by the EU’s capacity to absorb new countries in order to maintain 
the EU’s ability to act efficiently. Additionally, Paris emphasizes the need for a more 
balanced approach regarding the EU’s neighborhood policies towards the Union’s eastern 
neighbors and the southern Mediterranean countries. 
In addition to Central and Eastern Europe, other regions identified by London, 
Paris, and Berlin as crucial for European and global security include Northern and Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Balkans and Russia, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. The 
importance of all of these regions is recognized in the ESS. Within these parts of the 
world, London has narrowed its focus down to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Darfur, and 
Iraq due to limited resources.  
France’s strategic shift in emphasis from Africa to the Middle East is remarkable. 
The country intends to renegotiate longstanding security arrangements with certain 
African countries and to cut down the number of its military bases on the African 
continent. Additionally, the French permanent military presence in Abu Dhabi since May 
2009 does not necessarily conflict with EU policies but the bilateral character of those 
arrangements underlines how France pursues its national interests in the Gulf region. 
Preventing a major crisis in Asia that could possibly involve China, India and Pakistan is 
a concern explicitly outlined in the Livre Blanc, without being echoed in the ESS. 
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Two common security-related objectives of Britain, France and Germany that 
have become increasingly important over the last decade are energy security and the 
safety of sea routes ensuring global trade. These issues were not only raised in the 2008 
Report on the Implementation of the ESS; the EU has also taken concrete measures. With 
British, French and German participation the EU has launched an anti-piracy mission 
named ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia to improve maritime security in this area. 
3. Strategies and Concepts of Operation  
Britain, France and Germany agree on a broad definition of security that 
recognizes the interconnectedness between external and internal security. In line with the 
ESS, the three countries acknowledge the value of an integrated approach involving 
diplomatic, economic, financial, developmental and military measures, as the first choice 
for dealing with today’s security challenges. Using those instruments in a preventive 
manner to tackle an emerging crisis early on before it becomes fully developed goes not 
only to the heart of the British, French and Germany strategies, but also to the heart of the 
ESS. 
At first glance, the above mentioned commonalities as declared in the countries’ 
respective security documents are striking. However, London, Paris and Berlin have used 
the available instruments (diplomatic, economic, developmental and military) with 
diverging emphases. As pointed out earlier, since World War II, Britain and France have 
sustained a long tradition of military interventions involving the use of force, whereas 
Germany practiced checkbook diplomacy for decades before it began to send the 
Bundeswehr abroad in the 1990s. On the other hand, British Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) between the mid-1970s and 1999 was substantially lower than  
contributions of France and Germany (see Figure 1).198 While the ODA of London, Paris 
                                                 
198 “Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those flows to developing countries and 
multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including states and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: i) it is administered with the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and ii) 
it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 percent.” Official website of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/ (accessed 7 October 
2009). 
 72
and Berlin increased sharply after 2001 and the amounts spent are now quite similar, an 
analysis of the ODA recipient regions shows significant differences in spending 
priorities. In 2002, France spent half of its bilateral ODA in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 17 
percent in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Britain has followed a similar pattern in 
that its spending priorities appear to be guided by its ties with former colonies: 35 percent 
of London’s bilateral ODA was spent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 18 percent in South and 
Central Asia with India being the single largest recipient of ODA. In contrast, Germany 
has spread its bilateral ODA almost evenly throughout the regions of the world requiring 
development assistance.199 The bottom line is that, despite a consensus among Britain, 
France and Germany regarding the utility of an integrated approach to crisis management 
employing civilian and military instruments, each country has its own unique preferences 
for certain instruments and how to use them.  
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Figure 1.   Official Development Assistance (ODA) between  
1972 and 2008 
Different institutional preferences in response to today’s threats exemplify further 
national distinctions despite Britain’s, France’s and Germany’s declared commitment to 
multilateralism and the importance of international institutions. Effective multilateralism 
is one of the key concepts expressed in the ESS, and it has been acknowledged by all 
three states. Nevertheless, according to Emil J. Kirchner’s study published in 2007, 
NATO is Britain’s first choice to tackle an emerging crisis, followed by the UN and the 
EU. In contrast, France and Germany clearly prioritize the EU followed by NATO, the 
UN and the OSCE.200 Where necessary, London favors also a bilateral coalition with the 
United States. Together with France, Britain does not rule out unilateral troop 
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deployment where the country’s interests are at stake—an action which is not even an 
option in Berlin. In fact (as discussed earlier), Germany discourages pursuing national 
interests unilaterally as the country seeks to keep its partners committed to working 
through multilateral institutions where Berlin can exercise its influence.  
Germany’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council reflects the 
country’s ambition to take more responsibility in world affairs. A reform of the UN is 
supported by the EU as a whole, and it can be assumed that a third European voice in the 
UN Security Council would be in the broader interest of all EU member states. The 
current “P5 plus 1” negotiations with Iran serve as an example of Germany’s elevated 
role and demonstrate the fact that the voices of Britain and France alone are insufficient 
to speak for the entire EU. As Britain and France are reluctant to give up their national 
sovereignty by representing the EU’s position in the UN Security Council both countries 
strongly support a reform of the UN Security Council which underlines the British and 
French commitment to the UN. In the view of London and Paris, the UN Security 
Council needs to become a more representative, ambitious and effective body. To this 
end both countries actively support a permanent German presence in the UN Security 
Council.201 
Due to radically different historical experiences, Britain, France, and Germany do 
not share the same view regarding the use of force. A consensus in principle among 
Britain, France, and Germany that the use of force should be a last resort and legitimized 
by international law, does not translate automatically into an equal willingness to use 
military force. Within the EU, Britain, and France basically occupy one end of the 
spectrum as the countries that have demonstrated their willingness to use force repeatedly 
since World War II, and Germany occupies the opposite end with a deep-rooted 
reluctance to use military force. Despite this obvious divergence in security culture that 
will certainly remain for a while, it is important to notice recent trends that point towards 
a convergence of views in London, Paris, and Berlin. While each German troop 
                                                 
201 Neither the NSS nor the Livre Blanc specify whether Germany should have a veto power or not. 
Prime Minister, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent 
World (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, March 2008), 48. The French White Paper on Defence 
and National Security (Paris: Odile Jacob, July 2008), 108. 
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deployment abroad requires the authorization of the Bundestag, German soldiers have 
participated in numerous multinational operations since the mid-1990s. Some of these 
missions required the use of military force—e.g., Operation Allied Force in 1999. On the 
other hand, France has moved closer to the German position regarding the need to ensure 
the domestic legitimacy of troop deployments. Owing to a 2008 constitutional change the 
French Parliament has now a greater say when it comes to military operations abroad. 
Although parliamentary authority is not institutionalized in the same fashion in the 
United Kingdom, the British can also be expected to be more critical of future military 
operations outside the framework of existing international institutions after the domestic 
and international debate in 2003 concerning Iraq.   
Another example of the diverging security and defense priorities of Britain, 
France and Germany has had a direct impact on the EU’s military capabilities: the 
substantial capability gap between the British and the French armed forces on the one 
hand and the Bundeswehr on the other. German policymakers cannot overcome domestic 
policy constraints that would allow them to dedicate more resources to the Bundeswehr in 
order to live up to the country’s ambitions as declared together with all other EU 
members in the 2003 ESS. The ESS emphasized the need for increased defense budgets 
to transform the European militaries into more flexible, mobile forces.202 Instead German 
expenditures for defense have been substantially lower than the investments of Britain 
and France.  
While the British and the French armed forces have been the most capable 
militaries in the EU, with considerable power projection potential, “the quality of the 
Bundeswehr’s equipment and readiness for major CRO [crisis response operations ‘out of 
area’] score[d] 0.39 relative to 1.0 for the British forces,” concluded R.K Huber and B. 
Schmidt drawing on a study on German defense reform conducted in 1999–2000.203 
According to the authors, only a combination of structural reforms de-emphasizing 
                                                 
202 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: Council of the 
European Union, 12 December 2003), 14. 
203 R. K. Huber and B. Schmidt, "Limits of German Defence Reform: Results of Parametric Analyses 
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conscription and an increase in defense expenditures might improve the Bundeswehr’s 
capabilities in the long-term. With a continuously declining defense budget since 1990 
(see Figure 2), a continuation of conscription,204 and increasingly expensive procurement 
projects, the transformation of the Bundeswehr has been a cumbersome process. 
Personnel for key crisis management capabilities such as strategic air lift and helicopter 
operations are overstretched and their equipment is out of date. Considering Britain’s 
ambitions to remain interoperable with the high-tech forces of the United States and 
France’s proposed defense reform, including funding mechanisms, a comparison with the 
developments in Germany suggests that increasing the EU’s military capabilities is not 




Figure 2.   Military Expenditures of Britain, France and Germany  
between 1988 and 2008 
                                                 
204 Conscription was restructured and the number of conscripts reduced significantly. As of August 
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White Paper 2006 - on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, ed. Federal Ministery of 
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For Britain and France, strengthening the EU’s military arm (e.g., the 2003 
battlegroup and EDA initiatives) has been a priority ever since the emergence of ESDP. 
This priority could be easily reconciled with the necessity for capable national armed 
forces ensuring the freedom of action of London and Paris. The independent nuclear 
deterrents that will remain national priorities for the foreseeable future underline further 
the value that the British and the French place on their sovereign capability to act. 
Additionally, the nuclear capacities and the permanent seats in the UN Security Council 
contribute to Britain’s and France’s self-perception as great powers. Although France has 
offered to participate with interested EU member states in a dialogue about the role of 
nuclear deterrence in European security, an integration of the French or the British 
nuclear deterrent in ESDP is presently not likely.  
An analysis of British, French and German military contributions within and 
outside the ESDP framework reveals at least four findings. First, the majority of forces 
involved in out of area operations are deployed under NATO command and participate 
mainly in ISAF and KFOR. The fact that the EU’s military operations have been much 
smaller in scope and less ambitious than the operations of the transatlantic Alliance 
should be no surprise as the maturing ESDP has emphasized the integrated civil-military 
approach in crisis management.  
Second, Britain’s participation in military ESDP missions has been limited due to 
its preoccupation with Iraq and its institutional preference to work through NATO in 
response to crises.205 With its focus elsewhere, it must be concluded that London has not 
yet pursued the full potential of the ESDP.  
Third, Germany appears to have minimized the risk for its soldiers involved in the 
two RD Congo missions—probably the two “hottest” ESDP missions with German 
participation (see Table 6 in Chapter IV). French troops were the key players in both 
Congo operations, while Germany’s role was limited to strategic lift in 2003, and to one 
hundred troops in Kinshasa as well as a significant reserve force in neighboring Gabon (a 
                                                 
205 As of November 2008, 4,100 British troops were deployed in Southern Iraq. 
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comparatively stable and secure country) three years later. Berlin’s enthusiasm for the 
EU’s military operations in RD Congo and Chad following French initiatives has been 
primarily limited by a lack of direct national interest in these countries and indeed this 
region.  
Fourth, France has played the dominant role in the EU’s military operations. Paris 
is not only one of the major initiators of military ESDP missions but France has also 
offered repeatedly leadership and contributed considerable numbers of troops. The 
regional focus of the EU’s military operations on Africa is also remarkably compatible 
with long standing French interests and commitments in this continent. In sum, 
embarking the EU on military operations could be interpreted as a French attempt to raise 
the EU’s international profile in crisis management and to improve the capabilities of its 
EU partners while not losing sight of French national interests. 
With regard to the civilian aspects of ESDP (operations and institutions) it 
appears that Germany’s role is slightly elevated in comparison with the contributions by 
Britain and France. Several achievements in the realm of civilian ESDP during the 
German EU presidency in 2007 support this claim (see Chapter IV in this thesis). A 
strong Nordic influence on civilian ESDP helps to explain why a clear leading role by 
Britain, France, and Germany has not been observed.206 However, all three countries 
have seconded civilian personnel to several ESDP missions, and it appears that Britain’s 
commitment to civilian ESDP operations is more distinct than its support for the EU’s 
military operations.  
4. Contemporary Politics 
The relationship between NATO and the EU regarding ESDP has been among the 
most important and controversial issues in the short history of the latter. The individual 
links between London, Paris and Berlin on the one side of the Atlantic, and Washington 
on the other have influenced NATO-EU relations concerning ESDP to a great extent. The 
importance of effective cooperation between the European Union and the United States 
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was already highlighted in the 2003 ESS.207 At this point in time the French attitude 
towards Washington was one of suspicion that the United States exerted excessive 
influence in NATO, Europe and the world. Still promoting a multipolar world order, 
France’s approach to transatlantic relations has become more pragmatic lately. The 
country rejoined NATO’s integrated military structure in April 2009 in the expectation of 
a more balanced partnership between the European allies and the United States, and 
possibly in the hope of Washington’s blessing for ESDP. Thus, France has shifted its 
position on a spectrum from an extreme Europeanist position opposing Atlanticist Britain 
to a position somewhat closer to the center occupied by Germany. To be sure, France is 
committed as before to the European security and defense project but its attitude towards 
transatlantic relations has improved dramatically; and this might have also positive 
implications for ESDP. A positive sum game for France in several aspects, its 
rapprochement with NATO has the potential to improve French standing in the EU in the 
sense that it might reduce suspicion among some EU member states—especially in 
Eastern Europe—that Paris intends to undermine the alliance. A better standing in turn 
improves France’s chances to implement its ESDP agenda and to consolidate its leading 
role in ESDP vis-à-vis Britain and Germany.  
Britain has traditionally been the United States’ closest European ally since World 
War II. As such, London has used its influence at times to reduce the tension between 
European capitals and Washington, and to explain ESDP to the U.S. administration. 
Additionally, an influential British role in ESDP helps Washington to channel U.S. 
interests in Europe. 
Germany, like Britain, has valued the transatlantic relationship for decades. 
Berlin’s and London’s views are not only expressed in their own security documents but 
also in the ESS, which highlights the transatlantic relationship as irreplaceable.208 Strong 
transatlantic ties have long been at the heart of German and British foreign policies, and 
these national priorities have been successfully projected to the EU level. 
                                                 
207 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: Council of the 
European Union, 12 December 2003), 15. 
208 Ibid., 15. 
 80
While the British ESDP agenda is compatible with the German agenda in one 
aspect, Britain’s view parallels in part France’s vision with regard to the need to build up 
the EU’s military strength. However, the British and the French rationales for enhanced 
EU military capabilities were quite distinct in the years following the 1998 St. Malo 
declaration. Britain has sought to strengthen the transatlantic alliance and improve the 
interoperability of the EU and NATO militaries with the armed forces of the United 
States. In the view of London, ESDP has been a vehicle to reinforce NATO by increasing 
the military capabilities of the European allies, since most EU member states are also 
NATO allies. With this NATO-centric attitude (demonstrated by London’s preference to 
address emerging crises through the transatlantic alliance), and Britain’s unobtrusive 
participation in military ESDP operations, it must be concluded that the British are much 
less committed to ESDP than are France and Germany.  
France has promoted enhanced European military capabilities for the sake of an 
elevated European role in international crisis management and European autonomy in 
security—the latter to the dismay of Britain and the United States. But even France’s 
rationale had an external dimension: strengthening NATO’s European arm would 
eventually weaken Washington’s influence in the alliance and Europe. France’s attitude 
towards NATO has shifted since 2007, and the conciliatory language used in the 2008 
Livre Blanc made this clear.  
The bottom line, however, is that improving the military capabilities of the EU, a 
goal expressed in the ESS, has been high on the British and French ESDP agenda despite 
diverging rationales for most of the past decade. Germany has also supported enhanced 
EU capabilities—especially better civilian capacities—through cooperation among 
European Union members, without jeopardizing the transatlantic alliance.    
The April 2003 proposal made by Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg 
for a standing European Union military headquarters, was heavily opposed by the British, 
who saw such a body as a duplication of NATO structures. Without British support, the 
proposal was rejected. Nevertheless, the need for European Union planning capabilities, 
especially for civilian-military operations, led to the creation of the EU Operations Centre 
in 2007. In order to accommodate the British and American skeptics, the EU Operations 
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Centre is not a permanent headquarters but a body that can be activated on demand to 
plan and conduct autonomous ESDP operations. This intermediate solution must be 
considered a compromise recognizing French and German interests as well as British 
interests, although it must be admitted that Paris and Berlin have taken a significant step 
towards an independent European planning capacity proposed already at the 
“Pralinengipfel” in 2003. The headquarters issue is also well suited to demonstrate 
France’s ESDP priority to transform the EU into a more capable actor as opposed to 
Britain’s national priority not to undermine NATO’s standing in the European security 
architecture.  
In addition to the progress made regarding the EU’s planning capabilities, France 
has expressed ambitions that would foster European integration in the realm of security 
and defense. During the French EU presidency in 2008, France advocated the drafting of 
an updated ESS, but this proposal was rejected—inter alia by Germany. A common 
European White Paper, as proposed in the 2008 Livre Blanc, appears even less likely at 
present since all EU member states would have to agree on a broad variety of security 
questions such as threats, security interests and doctrines regulating the use of force. 
Despite the lack of collective EU approval so far, these proposals illustrate the French 
vision of a more ambitious and more capable EU that would play an even greater role in 
the European security architecture and an increasingly important role in international 
crisis management. Paris would not hesitate one moment to take the lead if it was 
mandated by all member states to pilot the EU during that journey.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Owing, in part, to divergent historical experiences in the twentieth century and 
before, Britain, France, and Germany have retained distinct national interests. These 
interests, in combination with the countries’ individual security cultures, have determined 
British, French and German priorities for the ESDP. Despite numerous commonalities in 
British, French and German security and defense priorities, certain national preferences 
persist. Britain’s view often parallels that of France. Both countries have the political, 
economic and military clout necessary to lead the EU in the ESDP realm, but it appears 
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that only the country that shares the historical defeat and devastation of World War II 
with most other continental European countries is fully committed to the European 
security and defense project: France.  
France’s attempts to enhance ESDP through various proposals—sometimes 
together with Britain (e.g., battlegroups, EDA), and sometimes with Germany (e.g., 
standing headquarters), as well as France’s initiation of (and participation in) most ESDP 
operations—justify the conclusion that France plays the predominant role in ESDP vis-à-
vis Britain and Germany. In other words, the answer to the question raised at the outset of 
this study—which country has been the most influential, with the most significant impact 
on the ESDP?—is clear. This nonetheless has not translated automatically into French 
leadership, since other EU members have been reluctant to accept any European Union 
country as the natural leader in security issues and favor the United States still playing an 
important role in European security.209 But sooner or later, if the United States’ strategic 
focus shifts further away from Europe, all EU member states may have to realize that 
European security requires leadership from within the EU. It remains to be seen what 
impact the EU president might have once the post has been created following the 
implementation of the Lisbon treaty.210 However, the ESDP’s inter-governmental 
character means that nation states play the key roles—with France at the forefront.  
The French commitment to the European defense project is certainly rooted in a 
desire to bring peace to Europe, but France’s need for glory and for recognition of the 
special role in the world of French civilization must not be neglected. French leadership 
in ESDP would allow Paris to pursue French interests on a much larger scale due to the 
EU’s vast resources in contrast to the limited French resources. Therefore, it can be 
argued that France’s commitment to ESDP is largely motivated by the French national 
interest to have a greater say in European and international affairs in the long run.   
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One British rationale to participate in ESDP parallels to some extent the French 
motivation. Britain does not share the Europeanist view of the French because London is 
committed to its special relationship with the United States and judges that it has helped 
the United Kingdom to preserve its great power status for decades. In order to maintain 
its voice and influence in Washington, Britain must have a say in Brussels regarding high 
politics. The preservation of London’s bridge function between Washington and 
European capitals continues to be a powerful source of political influence on both sides 
of the Atlantic elevating the United Kingdom’s status in international affairs—which is, 
after all, a British national interest.  
Because it cannot change the European security architecture in the short term, 
France pursues a dual track strategy: enhancing ESDP under French guidance as much as 
possible, while simultaneously retaining the country’s freedom of action in security and 
defense matters. France, unlike most EU member states, has the resources to maintain its 
strong balanced armed forces that ensure the country’s capability to act independently 
while they simultaneously strengthen the EU’s overall capability. Improving French 
military capabilities is consistent with the EU’s agenda but other French priorities are not 
easily reconciled with ESDP: the overseas territories, the nuclear deterrent, and French 
sovereignty regarding the permanent UNSC seat, as well as France’s standing security 
arrangements in Africa. Those remaining French priorities, together with the national 
priorities of many other EU member states, are contributing factors that slow down 
further integration in ESDP. In sum, it must be concluded that France—like Britain—
continues to have two security and defense policy agendas: one that is pursued at the 
national level and another at the EU level. ESDP has only been able to cover policy areas 
where there has been a consensus among EU member states; unique national priorities 
and interests are pursued at the individual national level.  
The country holding the six-month EU presidency certainly has the advantage of 
being able to set the ESDP agenda; but it appears that the big three EU member states—
especially when acting in concert—are able to push through proposals regardless of 
which country is holding the EU presidency. Due to the unanimity rule in ESDP 
decision-making, consensus on the proposed decision itself is still more important than 
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the status of the agenda setter. The 2003 proposal by Belgium, France, Germany and 
Luxemburg for a European Union operational headquarters was rejected as well as the 
2008 French suggestion to draft an updated ESS. While France held the EU presidency in 
the latter case, none of the countries in the former case was the EU’s nominal agenda 
setter at the time. 
Contradictions between the British and the French national agendas and the ESDP 
agenda are unlikely because all EU member countries have a veto power in ESDP 
decision-making. Furthermore, individual national security priorities lead to the diversion 
of resources away from the EU’s common security and defense policies. While Britain 
and France can afford to maintain their freedom of action and simultaneously satisfy the 
EU’s demands for enhanced military capabilities, most smaller EU member states cannot. 
With regard to Russia, the Baltic states, for example, have a different threat perception 
than Britain and France. It remains to be seen whether London and Paris can accept other 
EU member states’ decisions to maintain their freedom of action concerning for example, 
territorial defense instead of specializing, pooling and sharing forces to improve the EU’s 
military capabilities for international crisis management.  
Whether Britain and France’s willingness to act unilaterally has declined since the 
emergence of ESDP is still too early to evaluate in an objective and satisfactory fashion. 
London and Paris have emphasized recently in their respective security documents the 
multilateral approach for legitimacy reasons. The high concentration of military ESDP 
operations in Africa, mostly in response to French advocacy, could be interpreted as a 
departure from French unilateralism. As an alternative to unilateral action, ESDP offers 
another multilateral option for Britain and France that might restrict their freedom of 
action to some extent but gives potential access to the vast resources of the EU; and it 
increases the legitimacy of a military operation. However, in the end, both countries leave 
no doubt that they are willing to act unilaterally if their national interest is at stake. 
In comparison with the national objectives of Britain and France, Germany’s 
agenda is exceptional in that there is apparently no national interest Berlin pursues in the 
realm of security and defense policy unilaterally. ESDP basically covers Germany’s 
security and defense policy objectives beyond the country’s commitment to NATO and 
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the UN. That helps to explain why it is such a high priority in Berlin to keep multilateral 
institutions—including the EU—functional in order to support German interests. 
Germany’s commitment to the EU (as grounded in the Basic Law’s Article 23), the 
absence of national interests incompatible with those of the EU as a whole, the country’s 
political and economic power, and its cautious attitude towards military deployments 
abroad all make Germany a pivotal player in ESDP. Are Germany’s attributes the ideal 
preconditions for a leadership position in ESDP? The answer is more yes than no, but the 
fact is that a single-headed ESDP leadership by Germany is unacceptable to most EU 
member states for historical reasons—including Britain, France and Poland. 
A leading role in ESDP side by side with London and Paris is a realistic option for 
Berlin and certainly finds broad support among most EU member states. Germany’s 
distinctive security priorities and attitudes in comparison with those of the British and the 
French contribute to more balanced positions that are more representative of the EU as a 
whole. In general, as France seeks to push ESDP forward—especially by enhancing the 
EU’s military capabilities—Germany advocates the concept of the civilian power 
Europe.211 This may be attributed to Germany’s traditional focus on civilian instruments 
(e.g., diplomacy and development aid), its pattern of troop deployments avoiding high-
risk situations, and the country’s reluctance to dedicate more resources to the 
Bundeswehr. 
In other words, Britain and France occupy in many aspects the extreme ends of 
several spectrums vis-à-vis the other EU member states, whereas Germany takes often a 
more central or even the opposite position. This position is frequently much closer to the 
EU median and helps to explain Berlin’s influence in ESDP despite its lack of military 
might comparable to that of Britain and France. Several key factors in this regard should 
be noted. (a) Germany—like most other EU member states—has no standing 
responsibilities in overseas territories and no security arrangements with former colonies. 
(b) On the Atlanticist-Europeanist spectrum Germany’s position is closer to the center 
than to the extreme ends occupied by Britain and France. (c) Germany’s armed forces are 
                                                 
211 Daniela Schwarzer, Deutschland und Frankreich: Nie so nah, und doch so fern? (Berlin: 
Foundation Robert Schumann, 2008), 34. 
 86
a hybrid version seeking the balance between power projection and conscription, whereas 
the British and the French armed forces are all-professional forces—the mightiest in the 
EU. (d) Britain and France are much more willing to use military force than Germany is, 
which Berlin emphasizes civilian crisis management instruments—an approach strongly 
supported by the neutral and nonaligned EU member states.212 (e) In contrast to Germany 
and all other EU member states, Britain and France hold permanent seats in the UN 
Security Council and maintain their nuclear deterrents. These factors, together with 
Germany’s economic, political and (considerable) military power, help to explain 
Berlin’s leading role collectively with London and Paris in ESDP. 
While leadership in ESDP by a single European country appears unlikely, 
preeminent roles for Britain, France and Germany are unavoidable for a variety of 
reasons, including the fact that the three countries provide almost two thirds of the 27 EU 
member states’ total defense expenditures.213 Whether London, Paris and Berlin can lead 
the EU in security and defense matters effectively in a concerted effort remains to be 
seen. Observers of the maturing ESDP must be patient since centuries of frequently 
antagonistic foreign policies among European nations cannot easily be overcome within a 
few decades. To be sure, there are signs of convergence in the views of Britain, France 
and Germany in some respects. Examples include the general consensus on threat 
perceptions, the more compatible policies toward NATO, the limited progress in the 
European Union headquarters debate, the conduct of several civilian and military ESDP 
operations, and last but not least the very existence of the December 2003 European 
Security Strategy.  
As has become clear throughout this thesis, the comparison of Britain’s, France’s 
and Germany’s security and defense priorities still shows fundamental differences 
resulting in diverging preferences for ESDP. However, exactly this mixture of distinct 
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priorities has shaped inter alia the civilian-military character of ESDP. As a unique 
security provider the EU has begun to fill a gap in international crisis management. In an 
era of global security challenges that are profoundly different from the traditional warfare 
and territorial defense of the past, the pioneering approach of the EU appears to be a 
reasonable choice to address not only the symptoms but ultimately the root causes of 
emerging crises on the periphery of Europe and beyond.  
 
 88
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 89
LIST OF REFERENCES 
A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels: Council of the 
European Union, 12 December 2003. 
Archick, Kristin. The United Kingdom: Issues for the United States. 2007. 
Barzini, Luigi. The Europeans. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 
Belkin, Paul. German Foreign and Security Police: Trends and Transatlantic 
Implications. 2008. 
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den 
Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung. Berlin: 2003. 
Bulmahn, Thomas. Bevölkerungsumfrage: Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches 
Meinungsklima in Deutschland. Strausberg: Sozialwissenschafliches Institute der 
Bundeswehr, 14 November 2008. 
Charter of the United Nations, New York: United Nations, 2008. 
Chuter, David. "The United Kingdom." In The European Union and National Defence 
Policy, edited by Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, 105–120. London and New 
York: Routledge, 1997. 
Clarke, Michael. "French and British Security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World." 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 76, no. 4 
(October 2000): 725–739. 
Die Bundesregierung. Europa gelingt gemeinsam - Bilanz der deutschen EU-
Ratspräsidentschaft 2007. 
Dinan, Desmond. Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. 3rd ed. 
Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2005. 
Fröhlich, Stefan. "Deutsche Außen und Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen der EU." Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte no. 43 (20 October 2008): 15–21. 
Gallis, Paul. France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French 
Relations. 2009. 
Garton Ash, Timothy. Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the 
West. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 2004. 
Gordon, Philip H. "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy." International Security 22, 
(Winter 1997/98): 98–100. 
 90
Greenwood, David. "The United Kingdom." In The Defense Policies of Nations: A 
Comparative Study, edited by Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, 278–304. 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  Berlin:  Deutscher  Bundestag, 
January 2007. 
Hacke, Christian. "Deutsche Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzlerin Merkel." Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte no. 43 (2006). 
———. "Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime für die Außenpolitik Deutschlands." 
In Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, edited by Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause. Vol. 
3 Interessen und Strategien, 3–13, Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996. 
Haftendorn, Helga. Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945. Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. 
Hellmann, Gunther. "Goodby Bismarck? Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany." 
Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 1 (1996): 1–39. 
Hilz, Wolfram. Deutschlands EU-Präsidentschaft 2007 - Integrationspolitische Akzente 
in schwierigen Zeiten. Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2006. 
Hix, Simon. The Political System of the European Union. The European Union Series; 
Variation: European Union Series. 2nd ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Holländer, Lutz and Peter Schmidt. "Möglichkeiten der ESVP angesichts nationaler 
Europäscher Politik." Strategische Analysen (July 2005). 
Hoon, Geoff. “Unite and Lead: UK-German Partnership in Europe.” Humboldt 
University, Berlin, 16 May 2006. 
Howorth, Jolyon. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
———. "France." In The European Union and National Defence Policy, edited by 
Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, 23–48. London and New York: Routledge, 
1997. 
———. Prospects for the UK Presidency of the European Union. Paris Cedex: Institut 
francais des relations internationales, 2005. 
Huber, R. K. and B. Schmidt. "Limits of German Defence Reform: Results of Parametric 
Analyses for the Commission 'Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr'." 
The Journal of the Operational Research Society 55, no. 4, Special Issue: OR in 
Defence (April 2004): 350–360. 
 91
Hyde-Price, Adrian. "New Labour Und Die Britische Aussenpolitik." In Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte: Großbritanien, edited by Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. 
Bonn: 2005. 
"Joint UK-France Summit Declaration—27 March 2008."  
Jonas, Alexandra, Michael Klemm, and Nicolai von Ondarza. "Auf dem Weg zu einer 
Europäischen Strategischen Kultur?" Newsletter des Sozialwissenschaftlichen 
Instituts der Bundeswehr no. 1 (2009): 1–10. 
Kempin, Ronja and Marco Overhaus. Kein großer Sprung in der Entwicklung der ESVP: 
Lehren aus der Französischen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft. Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik - Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und 
Sicherheit, 2009. 
Keohane, Daniel. "Defensive Realignment." E! Sharp (September–October 2008): 38–40. 
Kirchner, Emil J. "Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional 
Responses." In Global Security Governance, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and James 
Sperling, 3–22. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
———. "European Union: The European Security Strategy versus National Preferences." 
In Global Security Governance, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 113–
133. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
MacShane, Denis. “Enlarging the EU: Peace and Prosperity in a Bigger and Better 
Europe.” Edinburgh University, Edinburgh, 21 May 2003. 
Maintz, Julia. Agencies for International Cooperation in Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training: A Guide to Source of information, Bonn: UNESCO-
UNEVOC International Centre, 2004. 
Major, Claudia. "The French White Paper on Defense and National Security." CSS 
Analyses in Security Policy 3, no. 46 (December 2008): 1–3. 
Maull, Hans W. "Nationale Interessen! Aber was sind sie?" Internationale Politik 61, no. 
10 (2006): 62–76. 
Meiers, Franz-Josef. "Germany: The Reluctant Power." Survival 37, no. 3 (Autumn 
1995): 82–103. 
Meyer, Christoph O. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on 
Security and Defence in the European Union, edited by BasingstokePalgrave, City of 
publication: Macmillan, 2006. 
 92
———. "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist 
Framework for Explaining Changing Norms." European Journal of International 
Relations 11, no. 4 (2005): 523–550. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe - Social Purpose & State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
Morgan, Roger. "The Foreign Policies of Great Britain, France, and West Germany." In 
World Politics - an Introduction, edited by James Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson 
and Gavin Boyd, 150–177. New York: The Free Press, 1976. 
Overhaus, Marco. "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past." SAIS Review 25, 
no. 2 (Summer 2005): 27–41. 
Prime Minister.  The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependant World, edited by Cabinet Office. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, March 2008. 
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a 
Changed World, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 11 December 2008. 
Rosenau, James N. "The Study of Foreign Policy." In World Politics - An Introduction, 
edited by James Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd, 15–35. New 
York: The Free Press, 1976. 
Ruiz Palmer, Diego A. French Strategic Options in the 1990s. Adelphi Papers. London: 
Brassay's, 1991. 
Schulze-Steikow, Renate. Öffentliche Ausgaben für Äußere Sicherheit 2004. Bonn: 2008. 
Schwarz, Hans-Peter and Deborah Lucas Schneider. "Germany's National and European 
Interests." Daedalus 123, no. 2, Europe through a Glass Darkly (Spring 1994): 81–
105. 
Schwarzer, Daniela. Deutschland und Frankreich: Nie so nah, und doch so fern?. Berlin: 
Foundation Robert Schumann, 2008. 
——— and Nicolai von Ondarza. Drei Zylinder für einen neuen Integrationsmotor? 
Vorraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-Deutsch-Französische 
Führungsrolle in der ESVP. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik—Deutsches 
Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2007. 
Schweigler, Gebhard. The Legacy of History and Germany's Future Role in International 
Politics. Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik—Deutsches Institut für 
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 1996. 
 93
Shearer, Andrew. "Britain, France and the Saint-Malo Declaration: Tactical 
Rapproachement Or Strategic Entente?" Cambridge Review of International Affairs 
13, no. 2 (2000): 284–299. 
Siedschlag, Alexander. "Germany: From a Reluctant Power to a Constructive Power?" In 
Global Security Governance, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 46–68. 
New York: Routledge, 2007. 
Tardy, Thierry. "France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy." In Global Security 
Governance, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, 25–45. New York: 
Routledge, 2007. 
Taylor, Claire. The Defence White Paper: Research Paper 04/71. London: House of 
Commons Library, 2004. 
The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, Paris: Odile Jacob, July 
2008. 
Triesman, David M. “A Strong, Competitive Europe is Vital,” Reception to mark 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, Mansion House, London, 9 January 
2007. 
Vernet, Daniel. "The Dilemma of French Foreign Policy." International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 68, no. 4 (October 1992): 655–664. 
Wallace, Willliam and Tim Oliver. "A Bridge Too Far: The United Kingdom and the 
Transatlantic Relationship." In The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress - US-European 
Relations After Iraq, edited by David M. Andrews, 152–176. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Wallace, Helen, William Wallace, and Mark A. Pollack. Policy-Making in the European 
Union. The New European Union Series. 5th ed. Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
White Paper 2006 - on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, edited 
by Federal Ministery of Defence 2006. 
Yost, David S. "France." In The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, 
edited by Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti. third ed., 233–277. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 




Zimmermann, Hubert. "Security Exporters: Germany, the United States, and 
Transatlantic Cooperation." In The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress - US-European 
Relations After Iraq, edited by David M. Andrews, 128–151. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 95
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
